United States v. Rocky Houston
813 F.3d 282
| 6th Cir. | 2016Background
- Rocky Houston, a convicted felon (convicted in 2010; appeal pending), was investigated by ATF after local law enforcement reported he openly possessed firearms at the family farm in Roane County, Tennessee.
- ATF installed a remotely operated camera on a public utility pole ~200 yards from the farm and recorded video (pan/zoom) for ten weeks without a warrant; agents then obtained a warrant on December 19, 2012 and continued monitoring.
- Videos showed Houston handling firearms on multiple dates during the surveillance; agents later executed search warrants on January 11, 2013 and seized 25 firearms from the farm and its occupants.
- Houston was indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) for being a felon in possession; counts were reduced to a single count of continuous possession “on or about” January 11, 2013. He was convicted by a jury and sentenced to 108 months (within Guidelines).
- District court denied motions to suppress the pole-camera footage (invoking no Fourth Amendment violation and/or good-faith exception), admitted pre-warrant video/photo evidence to show continuous possession, allowed lay identification/evidence testimony, and found Houston to be a “prohibited person” despite his pending direct appeal.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Government) | Defendant's Argument (Houston) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 4th Amendment: warrantless long-term pole‑camera surveillance | Surveillance was from a public vantage point; camera captured views any passerby could see so no reasonable expectation of privacy | Ten‑week secret surveillance of home/curtilage violated reasonable expectation of privacy; duration and technology distinguishable from ordinary public observation | No Fourth Amendment violation — camera viewed same public-visible areas; duration and use of technology not dispositive; even if error, admission harmless because warrant later obtained |
| Admissibility of pre‑warrant videos/photos to prove possession | Pre‑warrant recordings are relevant to continuous possession "on or about" Jan 11; not unfairly prejudicial or 404(b) propensity evidence | Videos showed firearms not proven to be those seized on Jan 11 and therefore irrelevant/misleading under Rules 403/404(b) | Admissible: evidence probative of continuous possession within a reasonably near timeframe and not unduly prejudicial |
| Lay identification/testimony by Special Agent Dobbs | Dobbs could reliably identify Houston and firearms in poor‑quality video based on personal familiarity | Dobbs lacked firsthand observation of the events and voir dire exclusion was error | Admission proper under Fed. R. Evid. 701; district court did not abuse discretion and any voir dire error was harmless |
| Status as a “prohibited person” under § 922(g)(1) while appeal pending | § 922(g)(1) looks to state law for definition of conviction; under Tennessee law Houston was convicted despite pending direct appeal, so he was prohibited | A conviction is not "final" while direct appeals pending; thus he was not a federal "convicted" felon for § 922(g)(1) purposes | Houston was a prohibited person: Tennessee law treats conviction as established after verdict/sentencing; federal precedent supports focusing on status at time of possession |
Key Cases Cited
- California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (warrantless public‑vantage observations of curtilage permissible)
- United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (use of technology to augment lawful public observation does not per se violate Fourth Amendment)
- United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (long‑term GPS tracking raises privacy concerns)
- Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (Fourth Amendment protects reasonable expectations of privacy)
- United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294 (curtilage analysis)
- United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772 (6th Cir.) (public‑vantage tracking cases and relevance of possibility of public observation)
- United States v. Forest, 355 F.3d 942 (6th Cir.) (cell‑phone pinging upheld where public observation possible)
- Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55 (use of possibly invalid state conviction as federal predicate does not violate due process)
- United States v. Morgan, 216 F.3d 557 (6th Cir.) (§ 922(g)(1) focuses on defendant’s status at time of possession)