United States v. Robert Ware, 964 F.3d 482

In 1997 Robert Ware was convicted of three federal drug counts and sentenced to 360 months’ imprisonment; the jury made no drug-quantity findings.
The PSR attributed large powder-cocaine quantity (26.6 kg) and a small cocaine‑base amount (3.6 g); guideline calculations produced a base offense level of 34, enhanced to 40, and a guidelines range of 360 months–life.
At sentencing the court accepted the PSR’s guideline calculation; the sentence did not specify statutory subsections of §841(b). Ware’s convictions and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal.
Apprendi later established that facts increasing a statutory maximum must be charged and proven to a jury; absent jury findings, defendants like Ware could only be sentenced under §841(b)(1)(C) (20‑year cap). Ware’s earlier collateral claims were unsuccessful because Apprendi was not applied retroactively on collateral review.
Under §404 of the First Step Act (2018) Ware moved for a reduced sentence; the district court found him eligible but denied relief in its discretion after considering §3553(a), the First Step Act’s legislative purpose, Apprendi implications, and concerns about disparities with similarly situated defendants.
Ware appealed; the Sixth Circuit reviewed for abuse of discretion (procedural and substantive) and affirmed the district court’s denial.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Ware)	Defendant's Argument (Government)	Held
Adequacy of §3553(a) consideration	District court focused on only three factors and failed to ensure sentence was “sufficient, but not greater than necessary.”	Court properly considered the pertinent §3553(a) factors and may weight them as appropriate.	No abuse of discretion; district court’s §3553(a) analysis was sufficient.
Weight given to First Step Act legislative purpose	Court put undue weight on the Act’s purpose in denying relief.	Court may consider the Act’s purpose and assign it appropriate weight.	No abuse; it was proper to consider the Act’s purpose alongside §3553(a).
Consideration of Apprendi and current statutory range	Court failed to fully account that under current law Ware would be capped at 20 years per count (Apprendi effect).	Apprendi does not itself grant retroactive collateral relief, but its impact is a legitimate factor for the court to weigh under §404; disparities justified limiting weight.	No abuse; district court considered Apprendi’s effect and permissibly gave it limited weight.
Jurisdiction to hear the appeal	Appeal is properly before the court.	Government questioned jurisdiction under §1291/§3742(a).	§1291 provides jurisdiction; §3742(a) is non‑jurisdictional and does not bar review here.

Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (Any fact, other than prior conviction, that increases the statutory maximum must be charged and proved to a jury)
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) (Federal guidelines are advisory)
United States v. Page, 232 F.3d 536 (6th Cir. 2000) (Apprendi limits which §841(b) provisions may be applied absent jury drug‑quantity findings)
Goode v. United States, 305 F.3d 378 (6th Cir. 2002) (Apprendi does not provide retroactive relief on initial §2255 collateral review)
United States v. Ware, 161 F.3d 414 (6th Cir. 1998) (affirming Ware’s convictions and sentence)
United States v. Allen, 956 F.3d 355 (6th Cir. 2020) (district courts may consider Apprendi‑type effects when exercising discretion under §404)
United States v. Richardson, 960 F.3d 761 (6th Cir. 2020) (procedural rules limiting relief do not preclude First Step Act appeals)
United States v. Boulding, 960 F.3d 774 (6th Cir. 2020) (district court must consider §3553(a) when ruling on First Step Act motions)
United States v. Dado, 759 F.3d 550 (6th Cir. 2014) (drug quantity treated as an element of certain §841(b) enhancements)
Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264 (2008) (discussion of retroactivity and that constitutional rules reflect pre‑existing rights)