United States v. Robert Sutton
20-2876
| 7th Cir. | Jul 16, 2021Background:
- Sutton was convicted for participation in a crew that committed 13 armed robberies; jury convicted him on robbery counts and three 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) counts.
- His sentence totaled 52 years: concurrent 87-month robbery terms plus mandatory consecutive § 924(c) terms (one 5-year and two 20-year terms).
- The First Step Act (2018) narrowed § 924(c) stacking rules but expressly made that amendment non-retroactive to previously imposed sentences.
- In July 2020 Sutton moved for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) on two grounds: (1) the First Step Act would reduce his aggregate mandatory minimums, and (2) his medical conditions (diabetes, hypertension, high cholesterol) made him vulnerable to COVID-19.
- The district court denied relief, holding that the First Step Act change was not an "extraordinary and compelling" basis to reduce a valid pre‑existing sentence and that Sutton’s COVID risk did not justify release given low case counts at USP Allenwood and Sutton’s danger to the community.
- The Seventh Circuit affirmed, concluding the district court did not abuse its discretion and that Sutton could not rely on the First Step Act amendment as an extraordinary and compelling reason for compassionate release.
Issues:
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the First Step Act's amendment to § 924(c) is an "extraordinary and compelling" reason under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) | Sutton: The reduced aggregate mandatory minimums after the First Step Act make continued enforcement of his pre‑Act sentence extraordinary and compelling | Government/District Court: The amendment is expressly non‑retroactive; courts may not use § 3582(c)(1)(A) to effect that change | Held: No. Court affirmed that the First Step Act amendment cannot be the extraordinary and compelling reason to reduce a pre‑Act sentence |
| Whether U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 (BOP policy statement) binds district courts deciding prisoner‑filed compassionate release motions | Sutton: The policy statement governs what counts as extraordinary and compelling | Government/District Court: Following precedent, the policy statement is not binding on district courts for prisoner motions | Held: Policy statement not binding; district courts retain discretion (per Gunn), though it may guide analysis |
| Whether Sutton's medical conditions and COVID‑19 risk warrant compassionate release | Sutton: Diabetes and other conditions increase COVID risk and justify release | Government/District Court: BOP measures and low active cases at facility reduce risk; release would pose danger to community | Held: Denied. District court did not abuse discretion in finding release unwarranted given facility conditions and risk to public |
| Whether courts may consider the First Step Act when weighing § 3553(a) factors | Sutton: Court should factor the Act’s changes into the § 3553(a) analysis to justify reduction | Government/District Court: Act may be relevant only after an extraordinary and compelling reason is found | Held: Act may be considered under § 3553(a) but only after a threshold finding of extraordinary and compelling reasons |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Gunn, 980 F.3d 1178 (7th Cir. 2020) (the Sentencing Commission policy statement in § 1B1.13 does not bind courts on prisoner‑initiated compassionate‑release motions)
- United States v. Saunders, 986 F.3d 1076 (7th Cir. 2021) (appellate standard is abuse of discretion; courts are not required to release every prisoner with serious health concerns)
- United States v. Sutton, 337 F.3d 792 (7th Cir. 2003) (affirming Sutton’s convictions and sentence on direct appeal)