United States v. Robert Stinson, Jr., 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 17478

Robert Stinson ran a sham investment fund, Life’s Good S.T.A.B.L., soliciting IRAs and self-directed IRA investors from 2006–2010 and diverting funds to personal businesses; approximately $17.6 million was solicited and ~$1.9 million returned.
He used fictitious marketing materials and obtained a favorable Morningstar rating based on false information; many victims relied on advisors and firm recommendations.
Two independent advisory firms, Brentwood Financial and Total Wealth Management (TWM), entered referral agreements with Stinson and solicited clients to invest, producing millions in investor contributions. It was unclear whether the firms invested their own funds on behalf of clients.
Stinson pled guilty to a 26-count indictment (wire/mail fraud, money laundering, bank fraud, tax offenses, obstruction, false statements) and was sentenced after a PSR applied several enhancements, including U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(15)(A) (+2 levels) for deriving >$1,000,000 in gross receipts “from one or more financial institutions.”
The District Court calculated an advisory range (offense level 38, CHC III), granted an upward departure and imposed a 400-month sentence plus restitution; Stinson appealed the § 2B1.1(b)(15)(A) enhancement and other procedural/substantive sentencing claims.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(15)(A) applies when funds came from individual investors solicited through financial-advisory firms	Stinson: “derived” requires that financial institutions themselves be the source of the >$1,000,000; here funds came from individuals, not the firms	Government: enhancement proper because Stinson persuaded firms to market fund, received substantial sums related to firms’ efforts, and firms were exposed to liability	The Court held the enhancement applies only when financial institutions are the source of the defendant’s gross receipts (i.e., the institution owns or controls the funds); on the record the application was error and constituted plain error requiring vacatur and remand for resentencing.

Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129 (plain-error review framework)
United States v. Greene, 212 F.3d 758 (3d Cir. 2000) (interpret Guidelines by plain meaning)
United States v. Hartz, 296 F.3d 595 (7th Cir. 2002) (2001 amendment substantively changed requirement; focuses on amount derived from financial institutions)
United States v. Van Alstyne, 584 F.3d 803 (9th Cir. 2009) (amendment more lenient; enhancement requires money flowing from financial institutions into defendant’s coffers)
United States v. Dickerson, 381 F.3d 251 (3d Cir. 2004) (clarity of statutory language can make error plain)