United States v. Robert Sharp
879 F.3d 327
| 8th Cir. | 2018Background
- Sharp manufactured and sold synthetic-cannabinoid “herbal incense” after release from federal prison; law enforcement found products containing AB‑FUBINACA (Schedule I) and cash proceeds.
- Sharp purchased chemicals labeled in emails as AB‑FUBINACA but claimed he believed the product was THJ‑011 (not scheduled).
- Sharp retained attorney Joel Schwartz for advice; Schwartz testified he warned Sharp synthetics were or would be illegal and advised him to stop. Sharp claims Schwartz failed to warn that AB‑FUBINACA was scheduled and that Schwartz received a sample for testing.
- Sharp pleaded guilty to three counts (conspiracy and two possession-with-intent counts) without a plea agreement, pleading Counts 2–3 on a theory of willful blindness.
- After pleading, Sharp moved to withdraw his plea; the magistrate and district court denied the motion following an evidentiary hearing. Sharp was later sentenced to 30 years and appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Sharp) | Defendant's Argument (Gov’t / Court) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether counsel’s conflict of interest / ineffective assistance warranted plea withdrawal | Schwartz was a necessary witness about Sharp’s mens rea; had Sharp known, he would have gone to trial; Schwartz also misadvised on willful blindness | Evidence showed Schwartz’s testimony would tend to support government’s case; his advice to plead was reasonable given overwhelming evidence; no adverse effect or deficient performance and no prejudice under Strickland/Cuyler | Denied — no abuse of discretion; claim fails under both Cuyler and Strickland standards |
| Whether plea lacked an adequate factual basis under Rule 11(b)(3) | Plea colloquy used the phrase “federal drug laws” and Sharp’s answers were too broad or ambiguous under McFadden; he insisted he believed substance was THJ‑011 | The colloquy and Rule 11 letter provided sufficient context and evidence (analogue theory, conduct, emails, concealment) to support willful blindness and knowledge | Denied — adequate factual basis existed for plea |
| Whether court plainly erred by not sua sponte reconsidering motion at sentencing | New sentencing evidence (recordings, witnesses) corroborated Sharp and undermined Schwartz, so court should have reopened plea-withdrawal request | Sentencing evidence did not rehabilitate Sharp’s credibility or undermine the government’s evidence; some testimony (e.g., urging false statements) harmed Sharp’s credibility | Denied — no plain error in failing to reconsider sua sponte |
| Standard of review for plea-withdrawal denial | N/A (procedural) | Abuse of discretion review; plain‑error for forfeited renewal at sentencing | Court applied abuse-of-discretion; plain-error review for failure to renew at sentencing |
Key Cases Cited
- Global‑Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S. 754 (2011) (defining willful blindness standard)
- McFadden v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2298 (2015) (knowledge element under §841 requires awareness of a controlled substance listed on federal schedules or treated as such by Analogue Act)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (ineffective-assistance standard: deficient performance and prejudice)
- Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980) (conflict-of-interest standard where representation and witness roles collide)
- United States v. Van Doren, 800 F.3d 998 (8th Cir. 2015) (standard of review for plea-withdrawal denial)
- United States v. Heid, 651 F.3d 850 (8th Cir. 2011) (Rule 11 factual-basis and withdrawal standards)