United States v. Robert M. Grafton, Jr.
697 F. App'x 672
| 11th Cir. | 2017Background
- Robert Grafton, Jr. was indicted on two counts: (1) using interstate commerce to persuade, induce, entice, or coerce a minor to engage in sexual activity (18 U.S.C. § 2422(b)), and (2) possession of child pornography involving a prepubescent minor (18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B)).
- Grafton pleaded guilty to the child-pornography count (Count Two) but contested Count One and proceeded to a jury trial on the § 2422(b) charge.
- The jury convicted Grafton on Count One; he appealed, challenging the district court’s jury instruction defining “induce.”
- The district court instructed the jury that “induce” means “to stimulate the occurrence of or to cause the minor’s assent,” following Eleventh Circuit precedent.
- Grafton argued that this definition was erroneous; the government relied on existing Eleventh Circuit authority interpreting “induce” broadly as “to stimulate the occurrence of; cause.”
- The Eleventh Circuit panel applied binding precedent and affirmed the conviction; Grafton’s petition for first-instance hearing was denied without prejudice to rehearing en banc.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Proper definition of “induce” in 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) jury instruction | Grafton: the court’s definition was incorrect and prejudicial | Government/District Court: instruction followed Eleventh Circuit precedent (Murrell) defining “induce” as to stimulate or cause assent | Court: Affirmed — instruction correct under binding precedent |
| Standard for conviction on attempted solicitation under § 2422(b) | Grafton: (implied challenge to intent requirement via instruction) | Government: must prove intent to cause minor’s assent and a substantial step toward that assent | Court: Re-affirmed that conviction requires intent to cause assent and a substantial step |
| Applicability of circuit precedent vs. appellant challenge | Grafton: sought different construction of “induce” | Government: panel must follow existing Eleventh Circuit decisions unless en banc or Supreme Court overturns them | Court: Panel bound by Murrell and other precedent; applied them |
| Whether instructional phrasing prejudiced jury despite accurate law | Grafton: phrasing misled jury and warranted reversal | Government: instructions, taken together, accurately stated law; isolated wording not reversible error | Court: No reversible error — instructions proper when read together |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Seabrooks, 839 F.3d 1326 (11th Cir. 2016) (standard of review for jury instructions and abuse of discretion)
- United States v. Gibson, 708 F.3d 1256 (11th Cir. 2013) (instructions reviewed for prejudice and overall accuracy)
- United States v. Lanzon, 639 F.3d 1293 (11th Cir. 2011) (elements for attempt under § 2422(b))
- United States v. Lee, 603 F.3d 904 (11th Cir. 2010) (§ 2422(b) criminalizes attempt to achieve a minor’s assent; intent requirement clarified)
- United States v. Murrell, 368 F.3d 1283 (11th Cir. 2004) (holding that “induce” means “to stimulate the occurrence of; cause” in § 2422)
- United States v. Vega-Castillo, 540 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2008) (panels are bound by prior circuit precedent)
- United States v. Brown, 342 F.3d 1245 (11th Cir. 2003) (same principle on panel obligation to follow precedent)