United States v. Robert Ivers, 44 F.4th 753

Robert Ivers was convicted of threatening a federal judge and related offenses; sentenced to 18 months plus three years supervised release.
After two prior revocations, a third revocation petition was filed three days after his September 7, 2021 release for alleged failures to follow probation instructions, reside in a residential reentry center, and maintain contact with his probation officer.
At the October 18, 2021 revocation hearing, Ivers’s appointed counsel (a different attorney than at prior proceedings) admitted he was unfamiliar with the case and made demeaning remarks to Ivers; Ivers asked for different counsel.
The district court offered Ivers a choice: keep the appointed counsel or represent himself; the court conducted a Faretta colloquy and accepted Ivers’s waiver of counsel.
The Eighth Circuit majority held Ivers was justifiably dissatisfied because his appointed attorney was unprepared, so the waiver was not knowing and voluntary and Ivers was denied his statutory right to counsel; the revocation judgment was reversed and remanded.
A dissent argued reversal requires a showing of prejudice and that the record of clear violations made any error harmless.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Ivers)	Defendant's Argument (Govt./District Court)	Held
Whether Ivers’s waiver of counsel was knowing and voluntary when his appointed attorney was unprepared	Waiver involuntary because counsel admitted ignorance of the case and made demeaning comments; Ivers was justifiably dissatisfied	Faretta colloquy established a knowing, voluntary waiver; a defendant does not have a right to counsel of choice	Court: Waiver not knowing/voluntary under the circumstances; denial of statutory right to counsel and due process violated; reverse and remand
Whether the district court’s Faretta colloquy was sufficient despite not inquiring into counsel’s competence	Colloquy insufficient when counsel was manifestly unprepared; court should have probed counsel’s competence or provided substitute counsel	Colloquy was sufficient to accept waiver; no duty to investigate counsel beyond the waiver procedure	Court: Given counsel’s admissions and demeanor, the colloquy alone was inadequate to show a voluntary waiver
Whether reversal requires showing of prejudice from the denial of statutory right to counsel	No explicit prejudice requirement argued by majority; focus on fundamental fairness of hearing	Dissent: Reversal of statutory-right errors requires a showing of prejudice that could have affected the outcome	Majority: reversed without requiring a separate prejudice showing; Dissent would have required prejudice and affirmed

Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) (right to self-representation and requirement that waiver of counsel be knowing and voluntary)
United States v. Owen, 854 F.3d 536 (8th Cir.) (review standard for waiver of counsel in supervised-release revocation and due-process focus)
United States v. Boultinghouse, 784 F.3d 1163 (7th Cir.) (due-process inquiry in revocation proceedings emphasizes fundamental fairness)
United States v. Hodges, 460 F.3d 646 (5th Cir.) (waiver may be shown by colloquy or totality of circumstances)
United States v. Mentzos, 462 F.3d 830 (8th Cir.) (no absolute right to counsel of one’s choice)
Al Khouri v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 461 (8th Cir.) (discussion of prejudice standard in statutory-right contexts)