708 F.3d 1216
11th Cir.2013Background
- Two troubled jurors and no alternates led the court to consider mistrial after jury selection and trial began.
- Davis elected to represent himself after Faretta colloquy, with standby counsel appointed.
- Juror Bedford sought to quit for financial reasons; juror Clerjuste cited language limitations; both were excused.
- With two jurors excused and no alternates, the court contemplated proceeding with fewer than twelve or declaring a mistrial.
- Davis objected to a mistrial; the court declared mistrial and later denied a motion to dismiss under the Double Jeopardy Clause; Davis appealed.
- The panel reviewed whether the mistrial was manifestly necessary and whether Rule 23(b) and Rule 26.3 requirements were satisfied.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Was the mistrial justified by manifest necessity? | Davis argues no manifest necessity. | The court found no viable alternative with jurors reduced to fewer than twelve. | Yes, manifest necessity supported the mistrial. |
| Was Clerjuste's dismissal manifestly necessary and does it moot Bedford's dismissal? | Clerjuste's language barrier could have been managed; Bedford's dismissal was contested. | Clerjuste's language issues made continued service infeasible; Bedford’s dismissal was moot if Clerjuste was removed. | Clerjuste's dismissal was manifestly necessary; Bedford disposal moot. |
| Did Rule 23(b) require consent for a jury of fewer than twelve after voir dire? | Davis did not consent to a smaller jury. | Rule 23(b) allows replacement or a smaller jury only with consent or good cause. | Rule 23(b) requirements violated absent consent; court proceeded with manifest necessity anyway. |
| Did Rule 26.3 notice/consultation requirement affect the ruling? | Court should have more formally consulted Davis. | Davis had opportunity to comment; failure was non-reversible under circumstances. | Not reversible error given the circumstances; rule compliance was not fatal. |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Chica, 14 F.3d 1527 (11th Cir. 1994) (manifest necessity review is fact-intensive; abuse of discretion standard applied)
- Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497 (U.S. 1978) (manifest necessity not defined literally; case-by-case assessment)
- United States v. Gordy, 526 F.2d 631 (5th Cir. 1976) (managing ends of public justice with defendant’s rights)
- United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. 579 (U.S. 1824) (oldest articulation of manifest necessity standard)
- United States v. Berroa, 374 F.3d 1053 (11th Cir. 2004) (Rule 26.3 as one factor in assessing discretion)