United States v. Robert Andrew Faber, 950 F.3d 356

In 2010 Faber pleaded guilty to receiving child pornography and was sentenced to prison followed by supervised release with conditions barring sexually explicit materials and unauthorized digital devices.
While on supervised release Faber lived with Tylyn Gieszer (his Wiccan spouse); probation discovered prohibited devices and explicit images after Gieszer lied and tried to hide devices.
The district court revoked supervised release, reimposed prison time, and included a no-contact condition barring Faber from contacting Gieszer; the Sixth Circuit previously affirmed that condition on direct appeal.
Faber filed multiple collateral challenges (§1983 suits, §2255 motion, other filings) arguing the no-contact order violated his religious freedom; those efforts failed in district court and on appeal.
After a later revocation the court again imposed the no-contact condition; Faber moved under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(2) to remove it as violating the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. The district court denied the motion.
The Sixth Circuit held the district court lacked jurisdiction to entertain a substantive legal/constitutional challenge to the legality of a supervised-release condition under § 3583(e)(2), vacated the denial, and remanded with instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether § 3583(e)(2) permits district courts to adjudicate the legality (including constitutional/RFRA) of a supervised-release condition at any time	Faber: § 3583(e)(2) can be used to remove the no-contact order because it burdens his religious exercise	Gov't: § 3583(e)(2) lists permissible factors for modification and does not authorize collateral substantive legal review; other avenues exist for legality challenges	Held: § 3583(e)(2) does not provide jurisdiction for substantive legal/constitutional challenges; district court lacked jurisdiction and must dismiss the motion
Whether the district judge displayed disqualifying bias against Faber because of his prior conviction	Faber: judge was prejudiced due to his prior conviction	Gov't: allegations are vague and unsupported	Held: Rejected—Faber raised no specific facts showing bias; standard from Liteky applies

Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83 (jurisdictional threshold)
United States v. Lussier, 104 F.3d 32 (district courts may not use § 3583(e)(2) to conduct unlimited legality review of conditions)
United States v. Gross, 307 F.3d 1043 (same principle applied in Ninth Circuit)
United States v. Neal, 810 F.3d 512 (Seventh Circuit dissenting view that § 3583(e)(2) does not bar legality challenges)
United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152 (limits on repeated collateral attacks)
Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540 (standard for judicial bias)