United States v. Roberson
2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 13397
| 10th Cir. | 2017Background
- On Dec. 31, 2014, Roberson sat in a parked car in a dimly lit pool-hall parking lot with a date; officers from a gang unit patrolled the lot at the venue’s request.
- Four patrol cars entered in a “wolf-pack” formation; two officers parked near Roberson’s car, shined bright spot/takedown lights into the vehicle, exited, and walked to the front of the car.
- As officers approached (within seconds), Roberson made furtive “stuffing” motions under the driver’s seat; officers then ordered hands up, drew guns, and after compliance smelled marijuana and found a gun under the seat.
- District court denied Roberson’s suppression motion, concluding seizure occurred only after officers developed reasonable suspicion based on the furtive motions.
- Roberson pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession, reserving the right to appeal the denial of suppression; the Tenth Circuit panel affirmed (majority), with one concurrence and one dissent.
Issues
| Issue | Roberson's Argument | Government's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether officers’ lights/approach constituted a show of authority that, combined with Roberson’s nonflight, produced a seizure before reasonable suspicion | The initial lights/approach were a show of authority and Roberson submitted immediately by remaining in the car, so any subsequent search was tainted | Even assuming a show of authority, Roberson did not submit at that moment because he made furtive stuffing motions; seizure occurred only after he complied with commands | Affirmed: court assumes a show of authority but holds submission (and thus seizure) occurred later when Roberson put his hands on the wheel, by which time officers had reasonable suspicion |
| Whether furtive motions supplied reasonable suspicion before formal commands/compliance | N/A (Roberson does not contest that furtive motions supplied reasonable suspicion) | Furtive stuffing motions gave officers reasonable suspicion to detain and investigate | Held: furtive motions generated reasonable suspicion to seize prior to discovery |
| Proper test for submission to show of authority: reasonable-officer view vs. passive-acquiescence (Brendlin) | Brendlin passive-acquiescence applies; objective reasonable-person would feel compelled and Roberson’s staying seated is submission | Court applies Tenth Circuit precedent (Salazar/Mosley): submission assessed from reasonable-officer perspective and requires manifest compliance (e.g., hands up) | Held: Tenth Circuit precedent governs; submission assessed from reasonable-officer view, Roberson manifested compliance only when he placed hands on wheel |
| Remedy for earlier seizure if seizure found to occur at initial approach | Suppress evidence (search/arrest unlawful) | Government: seizure only occurred later when reasonable suspicion existed; suppression not required | Court: suppression not required because seizure occurred when reasonable suspicion existed (majority); dissent would reverse and suppress |
Key Cases Cited
- Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249 (2007) (passive acquiescence can constitute submission to a show of authority, so a passenger is seized during a traffic stop)
- Mosley v. United States, 743 F.3d 1317 (10th Cir. 2014) (furtive motions contrary to commands do not manifest submission; seizure occurs when suspect manifests compliance)
- Salazar v. United States, 609 F.3d 1059 (10th Cir. 2010) (Tenth Circuit treats submission by reference to the view of a reasonable law-enforcement officer)
- California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621 (1991) (a seizure occurs by physical force or a show of authority; objective test for show of authority)
- Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (Fourth Amendment requires seizures be justified at their inception; distinguishes consensual encounters, detentions, arrests)
- United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194 (2002) (consensual bus encounters; no seizure absent coercive conduct such as blocking exits or brandishing weapons)
- United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980) (reasonable-person "free to leave" test for seizures)
- Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991) (refinement of free-to-leave test when person has no desire to leave)
- Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567 (1988) (police presence by itself does not always constitute a seizure)
- Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593 (1989) (roadblock or blocking movements can effect a seizure)