United States v. Riggins
2016 CAAF LEXIS 13
C.A.A.F.2016Background
- Appellant Quantaus R. Riggins, a Staff Sergeant, directed LCpl MS (a junior Marine) to drive him and later pressured her for sexual acts on March 20, 2013; she repeatedly refused but ultimately complied after sustained pressure in various locations including Appellant’s truck, garage, and home.
- Government charged Appellant with two sexual assault specifications and three abusive sexual contact specifications under Article 120, UCMJ, each alleging the acts were accomplished by placing the victim in fear of adverse career action via abuse of rank/authority.
- At trial (military judge alone), the Government relied solely on the ‘‘placed in fear’’ theory and did not allege or argue lack of consent as an element. Appellant defended against the fear-of-career theory.
- Mid-deliberations the military judge asked counsel about lesser included offenses, then convicted Appellant of assault consummated by a battery (Article 128, UCMJ) as a lesser included offense—an offense that requires lack of consent and unlawful force or violence—while acquitting on the original Article 120 charges.
- The CCA affirmed; this Court granted review to decide whether assault consummated by a battery is a lesser included offense of the charged Article 120 offenses and whether Appellant received fair notice of the offense/theory of conviction.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Government) | Defendant's Argument (Riggins) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether assault consummated by a battery (Art. 128) is a lesser included offense of sexual assault/abusive sexual contact (Art. 120) as charged | Art. 128 is traditionally a lesser included offense of Art. 120 and therefore permissibly convicted on that theory | Art. 128 contains elements (lack of consent; unlawful force/violence) not required by the Art. 120 specifications alleging only "placing in fear" | No. Art. 128 is not a lesser included offense because it requires lack of consent and an application of physical force that Art. 120 (as charged) did not require. |
| Whether conviction on the uncharged legal theory violated Appellant’s notice/due process rights | Conviction on lesser included offense permissible; no prejudice warrants reversal | Appellant was deprived of notice and tailored his defense to the fear theory; conviction on an unpled theory prejudiced him | Court found a notice/due process violation and prejudice; conviction overturned as to the Art. 128 findings and sentence reassessed. |
Key Cases Cited
- Tunstall v. United States, 72 M.J. 191 (C.A.A.F. 2013) (elements test for lesser included offenses; de novo review)
- Jones v. United States, 68 M.J. 465 (C.A.A.F. 2010) (elements test and fair notice principle)
- Alston v. United States, 69 M.J. 214 (C.A.A.F. 2010) (compare elements in context of the charge)
- Girouard v. United States, 70 M.J. 5 (C.A.A.F. 2011) (Article 79 authority and notice requirements for lesser included convictions)
- Bonner v. United States, 70 M.J. 1 (C.A.A.F. 2011) (elements of assault consummated by a battery; bodily harm definition)
- Johnson v. United States, 54 M.J. 67 (C.A.A.F. 2000) (lack of consent is an element of assault consummated by a battery)
- Esparza v. United States, 540 U.S. 12 (2003) (harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard for constitutional error)