United States v. Ricky Peeples
879 F.3d 282
| 8th Cir. | 2018Background
- At ~1:00 a.m., Peeples fired a .22 revolver from his upstairs apartment after arguing with downstairs neighbors; officers found live rounds in plain view, spent casings, the revolver, and ammunition.
- Peeples pled guilty to Possession of Ammunition by a Felon (18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2)) and did not deny that his conduct constituted Iowa Intimidation with a Dangerous Weapon (Iowa Code § 708.6).
- The PSR treated a 1991 Iowa attempted-murder conviction (Iowa Code § 707.11) as a prior “crime of violence,” yielding a base offense level 20 under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(4).
- A four-level adjustment under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6) was applied for possession of a firearm/ammunition in connection with another felony (Intimidation), then three levels deducted for acceptance of responsibility (total level 21).
- The district court found the § 2K2.1(b)(6) adjustment insufficient to account for the extreme dangerousness of firing into a neighbor’s bedroom and imposed an additional four-level upward departure under U.S.S.G. § 5K2.6, producing offense level 25 and a guideline range of 84–105 months; the court sentenced Peeples to 105 months and stated it would have imposed that sentence even if base-level calculation differed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Iowa attempted-murder (Iowa Code § 707.11) is a "crime of violence" under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(4) | Peeples: statute is overbroad ("any act" allows omissions like withholding food) so force is not an element, so not a crime of violence | Government: the statute requires the use or attempted use of force (including indirect means); attempted murder necessarily involves violent force | Court: Affirmed—statute is indivisible; attempt to cause death necessarily involves use/attempted use of force and qualifies as a crime of violence |
| Whether district court erred by imposing a 4-level upward departure under U.S.S.G. § 5K2.6 (after a 4-level § 2K2.1(b)(6) adjustment) | Peeples: departure double counts the same conduct already accounted for by § 2K2.1(b)(6) | Government: § 2K2.1(b)(6) addresses firearm use in connection with a felony; § 5K2.6 addresses the heightened risk of death/bodily injury from firing into a residence—distinct harms | Court: No error—enhancements address distinct harms (use of firearm vs. extraordinary danger to multiple victims) |
| Whether the 105-month sentence is substantively unreasonable under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) | Peeples: (implicit) sentence excessive given circumstances | Government/District Court: sentence justified by seriousness, dangerousness, and Peeples’s criminal history; court considered § 3553(a) factors | Court: No abuse of discretion; sentence was substantively reasonable |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Rice, 813 F.3d 704 (8th Cir.) (analysis of "crime of violence" and categorical approach)
- United States v. Castleman, 134 S. Ct. 1405 (2014) (indirect means of causing harm can constitute use of force)
- United States v. Donelson, 450 F.3d 768 (8th Cir.) (no double counting where different harms are addressed by separate enhancements)
- United States v. Porter, 409 F.3d 910 (8th Cir.) (upward departure under § 5K2.6 appropriate for firing into a home despite other firearm enhancement)
- Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016) (divisible vs. indivisible statute analysis for categorical approach)