964 F.3d 307
5th Cir.2020Background
- Federal agents investigated a child‑pornography website that accepted Bitcoin payments.
- Bitcoin transactions are recorded on a public blockchain showing sender and receiver addresses and amounts; addresses are pseudonymous but deanonymizable by analysis.
- Agents used a third‑party blockchain‑analysis service to identify a cluster of addresses controlled by the Website.
- The government served a grand jury subpoena on Coinbase for account records tied to those addresses; Coinbase identified Gratkowski.
- Using that information, agents obtained a search warrant for Gratkowski’s home and seized a hard drive with child pornography; Gratkowski admitted Website use.
- Gratkowski moved to suppress, arguing Fourth Amendment privacy rights in blockchain and Coinbase records; the district court denied suppression, he pled guilty conditionally, and appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy in Bitcoin blockchain records | Carpenter should limit third‑party doctrine; blockchain records reveal transaction histories and can be privacy‑sensitive | Blockchain is public and limited (addresses, amounts); information is voluntarily exposed and like bank/phone records | No reasonable expectation of privacy in blockchain records; third‑party doctrine applies |
| Whether individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy in Coinbase account/transaction records | Coinbase records are private customer records and should be protected under Carpenter's reasoning | Coinbase is a regulated financial intermediary like a bank; records are limited and voluntarily conveyed | No reasonable expectation of privacy in Coinbase records; Miller/Smith analogy controls |
| Whether blockchain analysis or agents' methods violated Fourth Amendment (and whether suppression is warranted) | Sophisticated deanonymization intruded on a protected area and required suppression | No protected privacy interest to intrude upon; alternatively, agents acted in objectively reasonable good faith pre‑Carpenter | No Fourth Amendment intrusion; even if Carpenter applied, good‑faith exception would bar suppression |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976) (bank records held by third party carry no Fourth Amendment privacy interest)
- Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) (third‑party doctrine applied to telephone call logs)
- Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018) (limited third‑party doctrine for detailed cell‑site location information)
- United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012) (reasonable expectation of privacy framework and discussion of search concepts)
- United States v. Ganzer, 922 F.3d 579 (5th Cir. 2019) (standard of review for suppression rulings)
- United States v. Molina‑Isidoro, 884 F.3d 287 (5th Cir. 2018) (good‑faith exception to suppression)
