United States v. Ricardo Saucedo, 956 F.3d 549

Background

In 2008 Macias‑Saucedo, a Mexican national, signed a stipulated request for removal and waived a hearing; an IJ ordered him removed. He did not appeal or move to reopen.
On May 9, 2018 ICE encountered and civilly detained him, served notices to reinstate the prior removal order, and held him pending removal.
On June 4, 2018 federal prosecutors filed a criminal complaint for illegal reentry and Macias‑Saucedo was transferred to U.S. Marshals (criminal custody).
A grand jury returned an indictment on June 20, 2018—within 30 days of his entry into criminal custody.
Macias‑Saucedo moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing (1) Speedy Trial Act/Rule 5 violations (and that ICE’s detention was a “ruse” to delay the clock) and (2) the 2008 removal order was invalid under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d). The district court denied relief; he pleaded guilty conditionally and appealed.
The Eighth Circuit affirmed: no Speedy Trial Act violation (and no ruse), no entitlement to an evidentiary hearing, and §1326(d) collateral attack failed for lack of exhaustion/knowing waiver.

Issues

Issue	Macias‑Saucedo's Argument	Government's Argument	Held
Whether the Speedy Trial Act/Ru1e 5(a) was violated because indictment came after prolonged civil detention	Civil detention by ICE on May 9 should trigger Rule 5/30‑day Speedy Trial clock; indictment returned too late	Civil immigration detention is civil and does not trigger criminal timing rules; criminal custody began June 4 so indictment (June 20) was timely	No violation; criminal custody began June 4 and indictment was within 30 days
Whether the “ruse exception” applies (i.e., ICE detained primarily to aid prosecution)	ICE colluded/used civil detention as a ruse to buy time for prosecution	No collusion; ICE had a lawful basis to reinstate removal and no evidence detention’s primary purpose was prosecution	Ruse exception not applied; record shows lawful civil detention and no evidence of primary purpose to facilitate prosecution
Whether an evidentiary hearing was required on the ruse/custody issue	District court should have held a hearing to develop evidence of improper purpose	No disputed material facts shown; defendant did not identify evidence he would present	No abuse of discretion in denying hearing
Whether Macias‑Saucedo may collaterally attack the 2008 removal order under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d)	The 2008 removal was invalid (not knowing/voluntary), so conviction under § 1326(a) cannot stand	2008 record shows knowing, voluntary waiver and failure to exhaust administrative remedies bars collateral attack	Collateral attack barred: he knowingly waived rights in 2008 and failed to exhaust/appeal; §1326(d) challenge fails

Key Cases Cited

United States v. Aldaco, 477 F.3d 1008 (8th Cir. 2007) (standard of review for Speedy Trial Act factual findings and legal conclusions)
United States v. Perez‑Perez, 337 F.3d 990 (8th Cir. 2003) (civil deportation detention does not trigger Rule 5 or Speedy Trial Act)
United States v. Grajales‑Montoya, 117 F.3d 356 (8th Cir. 1997) (time in civil immigration detention not counted for Speedy Trial Act)
United States v. Pasillas‑Castanon, 525 F.3d 994 (10th Cir. 2008) (describing narrow “ruse exception” to Speedy Trial Act where civil detention’s primary purpose is prosecution)
United States v. Noel, 231 F.3d 833 (11th Cir. 2000) (ruse exception requires evidence detention served primarily to hold for prosecution)
United States v. Santos‑Pulido, 815 F.3d 443 (8th Cir. 2016) (district court’s denial of evidentiary hearing reviewed for abuse of discretion)
United States v. Torres‑Sanchez, 68 F.3d 227 (8th Cir. 1995) (collateral challenge to removal order allowed when due process violated and judicial review denied)
United States v. Mendoza‑Lopez, 481 U.S. 828 (1987) (due process/judicial review requirement for collateral attacks on deportation orders)
United States v. Mendez‑Morales, 384 F.3d 927 (8th Cir. 2004) (explaining §1326(d) elements)
United States v. Martinez‑Amaya, 67 F.3d 678 (8th Cir. 1995) (defendant bears burden in collateral‑attack challenge)
United States v. Tamayo‑Baez, 820 F.3d 308 (8th Cir. 2016) (knowing, voluntary waiver of appeal bars later collateral attack)