United States v. Reynaldo Macedo-Flores, 788 F.3d 181

Macedo-Flores appeals his convictions for conspiracy to distribute 500+ grams of cocaine and meth, obstruction of justice, and two perjury counts.
Investigation began with undercover drug buys by Detective Boston (Feb 2012–July 2013) and wire/tap recordings of many transactions.
Codified references during calls to ‘la doña’ and ‘la señora’ led investigators to interpret those terms as referring to Macedo’s mother.
A key April 24, 2013 transaction involved Macedo’s mother retrieving meth and confirming payment, which was recorded and later testified to at trial.
Macedo testified at his mother’s trial, denying that his mother conspired with him or that he told her the drug proceeds were for Madrigal.
Macedo sought a sentencing entrapment jury instruction; the district court denied it and the jury convicted on all counts; he was variably sentenced downward.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether sentencing entrapment instruction was required	Macedo argued for sentencing entrapment as to quantity.	Macedo contends government inflated quantities to raise sentence.	District court did not abuse discretion; no sentencing entrapment recognized here.
Whether evidence proves materiality of perjury	Macedo claims insufficient materiality for perjury counts.	Government proved false statements were material to knowing participation.	There was sufficient evidence that the false statements were material.
Whether lay opinion on coded terms was properly admitted	Torres’s lay interpretation of slang was improper as lay opinion.	Torres’s testimony aided understanding of code words; permissible lay opinion.	District court did not abuse discretion; lay opinion admissible and harmless.

United States v. Tremelling, 43 F.3d 148 (5th Cir. 1995) (true entrapment framework referenced)
United States v. Stephens, 717 F.3d 440 (5th Cir. 2013) (sentencing entrapment not recognized in this circuit)
United States v. Bradfield, 113 F.3d 515 (5th Cir. 1997) (extensive government inducement as prima facie evidence)
Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540 (U.S. 1992) (government inducement vs predisposition framework)
United States v. Cuesta, 597 F.2d 903 (5th Cir. 1979) (materiality tied to statements about knowledge of illegal activities)
United States v. Jimenez, 593 F.3d 391 (5th Cir. 2010) (materiality standard for perjury evidence)
United States v. Akins, 746 F.3d 590 (5th Cir. 2014) (lay opinion on code words permissible given investigation context)
United States v. El-Mezain, 664 F.3d 467 (5th Cir. 2011) (lay opinion allowed when based on first-hand observations)
United States v. Miranda, 248 F.3d 434 (5th Cir. 2001) (linguistic interpretation by investigators permissible)
United States v. Damato, 554 F.2d 1371 (5th Cir. 1977) (materiality must be tied to actual issues in the prior proceeding)