United States v. Renzi, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 12694

Background

Renzi, a former U.S. Representative, is charged in SSI with 48 counts related to land-exchange negotiations and public corruption.
Renzi moves interlocutorily to invoke the Speech or Debate Clause to preclude prosecution and to suppress evidence.
Alleged scheme: RCC and later Aries would purchase Sandlin property to enable a land-exchange bill Renzi would support.
Renzi failed to disclose his creditor relationship with Sandlin, who earlier owed him about $700,000 plus interest.
Dealings included Sandlin’s $200,000, then $533,000 payments to Renzi via Patriot Insurance; no land-exchange bill was ever introduced.
District court denied a Kastigar-like hearing, denied dismissal of the indictment, and allowed some legislative-act evidence to be admitted; Renzi appeals.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Are Renzi's negotiations protected legislative acts?	Renzi's acts fall within the Clause's protection.	The negotiations are not protected and do not qualify as legislative acts.	No; negotiations not protected legislative acts; indictment survives.
Should the indictment be dismissed due to pervasive legislative-act evidence presented to the grand jury?	Indictment relies on tainted evidence and should be dismissed.	Indictment does not rely on such evidence; dismissal unwarranted.	Indictment affirmed; tainted exhibits were not essential to proof.
Was a Kastigar-like hearing required to assess use of privileged evidence?	A Kastigar-like hearing is necessary to prevent tainted derivations.	No Kastigar-like hearing is warranted; no non-disclosure privilege applies broadly.	No Kastigar-like hearing required; no expanded non-disclosure privilege adopted.

Key Cases Cited

Brewster v. United States, 408 U.S. 501 (U.S. 1972) (limits broad reading of legislative acts; bribery context; protection not absolute for all related activities)
Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 (U.S. 1972) (recognizes threefold scope of privilege; distinguishes testimony vs. documentary evidence)
Helstoski v. United States, 442 U.S. 477 (U.S. 1979) (protects legislative acts from being used to prosecute; later discusses disclosure to grand juries)
Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491 (U.S. 1975) (absolute protection for legislative acts; limits of what may be questioned)
Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (U.S. 1880) (establishes breadth of 'legislative act' concept beyond debate)
Johnson v. United States, 383 U.S. 169 (U.S. 1966) (permits prosecution for conduct not involving legislative acts; limits breadth of privilege)
Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (U.S. 1951) (conduct at committee hearings may be within sphere of legitimate legislative activity)
Miller v. Transamerican Press, Inc., 709 F.2d 524 (9th Cir. 1983) (limits on applying Miller to situations where no crime is tied to investigation)
Swindall v. City of Valley, 971 F.2d 1531 (11th Cir. 1992) (adopted middle-ground standard for indictment validity when legislative acts referenced to grand jury)
Calandra v. United States, 414 U.S. 338 (U.S. 1974) (grand jury remedies; ordinary trial rules do not automatically apply to grand jury challenges)
Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (U.S. 1972) (immunity and derivative-use principles; framework for Kastigar-like analyses)
Rostenkowski, 59 F.3d 1291 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (discusses treatment of legislative acts and testimony; relation to privilege)
Helstoski II, 635 F.2d 199 (3d Cir. 1980) (grand jury standard for considering privileged material)