United States v. Rentz
2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 1952
| 10th Cir. | 2015Background
- Rentz fired a single gunshot that wounded one victim and killed another, leading to § 924(c) charges based on use of a firearm during and in relation to crimes of violence.
- The government seeks two § 924(c) convictions from one act, arguing the unit of prosecution can be the underlying crimes of violence, not the single use of a firearm.
- The en banc court was asked to decide whether § 924(c)(1)(A) permits multiple charges for a single use, carry, or possession of a firearm tied to multiple predicate offenses.
- The majority and concurriers analyze verb and adverbial language, legislative history, and the rule of lenity to determine the proper unit of prosecution.
- Judge Barrett (dissent) previously held Barrett allowed multiple § 924(c) counts from a single gunshot; Rentz’s en banc review rejects that view.
- The court vacates the panel’s decision, affirms the district court, and remands, holding that multiple § 924(c) charges from a single use are not permissible.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Unit of prosecution for § 924(c) | Rentz argues one use yields one § 924(c) count; multiple counts require separate uses or separate predicate offenses. | The Government contends the unit is the underlying crime plus each use, allowing multiple counts from a single act. | Ambiguity exists; lenity limits to one § 924(c) count per single use. |
| Relation between verb and unit of prosecution | Verbs uses/carries/possesses plus adverbial modifiers imply independent acts for each charge. | Verbs alone cannot define unit; modifiers do not mandate independent charges for each predicate. | Textual clues support separate uses but not definitively; ambiguity remains. |
| Double jeopardy concern under Blockburger vs unit rule | Two § 924(c) counts may be permissible if underlying offenses are distinct. | Unit of prosecution could foreclose multiple § 924(c) counts arising from one act. | Unit-of-prosecution analysis governs; Barrtt not controlling here; single unit may preclude dual counts. |
| Rule of lenity applicability | Ambiguity warrants lenity to prevent punishing a single act as multiple offenses. | Lenity should not distort congressional intent; other factors may justify multiple counts. | Lenity applies to permit only one § 924(c) charge for Rentz. |
| Impact of Barrett precedent | Barrett supports multiple counts from a single gunshot when underlying offenses are separate. | Barrett is not controlling on unit-of-prosecution; en banc should follow lenity broadly. | Barrett does not control the en banc outcome; one § 924(c) charge permissible here. |
Key Cases Cited
- Rosemond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1240 (2014) (recognizes § 924(c) as a combination crime; informs unit analysis)
- Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81 (1955) (lenity applied to ambiguous unit of prosecution)
- Ladner v. United States, 358 U.S. 169 (1958) (lenity used where unit of prosecution ambiguous)
- Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54 (1978) (discusses unit of prosecution and double jeopardy context)
- Barrett v. United States, 496 F.3d 1079 (10th Cir. 2007) ( Barret held multiple § 924(c) counts from single gunshot; later overruled for en banc context)
- Phipps v. United States, 319 F.3d 177 (5th Cir. 2003) (lenity applied; unit of prosecution ambiguity recognized)
- Finley v. United States, 245 F.3d 199 (2d Cir. 2001) (lenity applied; statute text ambiguous regarding unit)
- Cureton v. United States, 739 F.3d 1032 (7th Cir. 2014) (endorses single § 924(c) violation when one firearm use yields multiple offenses)
- Rodriguez-Moreno, 526 U.S. 275 (1999) (emphasizes verb-based analysis with caution; not sole determinant)