798 F.3d 1204
9th Cir.2015Background
- In 2013 the U.S. Marshals Service requested that the Southern District of California adopt a policy producing pretrial detainees in full restraints (leg shackles, handcuffs, belly band — "five point restraints") for most non-jury proceedings.
- After a Marshals presentation, the Chief Judge announced that the district judges would defer to the Marshals; the policy took effect October 21, 2013, with limited exceptions (guilty pleas, sentencing) and allowing any judge to order removal in a particular case.
- The Marshals cited increased inmate violence, two in-court attacks, higher criminal volume, three courthouses after a new courthouse opened in 2012, and staffing strain as reasons for the policy.
- Several defendants (consolidated appeals) challenged denials of individual unshackling requests; the district court denied relief and the defendants appealed.
- The Ninth Circuit previously requires an "adequate justification of necessity" for blanket pretrial shackling policies (United States v. Howard); the court here evaluated whether the Southern District met that standard.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a blanket pretrial policy authorizing full five-point restraints for most non-jury proceedings is permissible under due process | The blanket policy lacks adequate justification; it imposes greater liberty, dignity, and counsel-communication harms and requires stronger justification than in Howard | Deck and historical precedent allow routine shackling in non-jury proceedings; deference to Marshals is appropriate given security incidents and staffing limits | Vacated and remanded: the Southern District failed to provide adequate justification for such a broad, restrictive full-restraint policy |
| What evidentiary showing is required to justify a generalized non-jury shackling policy | Courts must require a district-level, case-specific or sufficiently detailed institutional justification showing necessity, not mere deference to Marshals’ resource constraints | Judges can defer to Marshals’ professional judgment without detailed statistics or showing infeasibility of alternatives | Held that some deference is appropriate but the record lacked sufficient justification here; economic/staffing strain alone is insufficient |
| Whether Howard controls and permits this policy | Howard upheld a limited leg-shackling policy in a specific courthouse context | Government argues Howard permits district-wide generalized policies based on Marshals’ concerns | Court distinguishes Howard: this policy is broader (five-point, many proceedings, magistrate and district judges) and requires a stronger showing than Howard provided |
| Whether less restrictive alternatives needed to be considered | Plaintiffs argue alternative measures (increased staffing, security changes) were not evaluated | Government relies on asserted practical constraints and incidents to justify restraints | Court notes failure to demonstrate that less-restrictive measures were infeasible or insufficient in the record before it |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Howard, 480 F.3d 1005 (9th Cir. 2007) (blanket non-jury shackling policy must have adequate justification of necessity)
- Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622 (2005) (identifies presumption of innocence, right to counsel, and dignity of proceedings as principles implicated by visible shackling)
- United States v. Zuber, 118 F.3d 101 (2d Cir. 1997) (court may defer to Marshals’ professional judgment for individual courtroom precautions; does not endorse blanket pretrial shackling)