United States v. Rene Johnson, 990 F.3d 661

Rene L. Johnson was indicted (Sept. 7, 2017) and made her initial appearance on Sept. 15, 2017; the Speedy Trial Act 70‑day clock began then.
The district court granted four continuances between Nov. 2017 and July 2018 (two government motions, one joint request to extend trial length, and a sua sponte continuance the court attributed to a scheduling conflict).
The court excluded the periods covered by those continuances from the Speedy Trial Act computation and denied Johnson’s pretrial motion to dismiss for Speedy Trial Act and Sixth Amendment violations.
Trial began Oct. 29, 2018 (≈14 months after initial appearance); jury convicted Johnson of wire fraud; she appealed.
The Eighth Circuit held the fourth continuance (sua sponte rescheduling attributed to the court’s crowded docket) was not excludable under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A)/(C), reversed for Speedy Trial Act relief, and remanded for the district court to decide whether dismissal should be with or without prejudice; it affirmed denial of the Sixth Amendment claim.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the fourth continuance was excludable under the Speedy Trial Act	Johnson: fourth continuance was caused by general docket congestion and thus is not excludable; the 70‑day clock expired before trial	Government/District: continuance served ends of justice; delays were case‑specific (discovery, witness unavailability, extended trial length) and properly excluded	Reversed as to the Act: fourth continuance was driven by the court’s scheduling congestion and not excludable; Speedy Trial Act violation; remanded for district court to decide remedy (with/without prejudice)
Whether the Sixth Amendment speedy trial right was violated	Johnson: nearly 14‑month delay infringed Sixth Amendment rights	Government: Barker factors do not support constitutional violation (delay reasons, weak assertion by defendant, little prejudice)	Affirmed: Sixth Amendment claim fails (delay only slightly beyond trigger, reasons weighed slightly against government, defendant weakly asserted right, insufficient prejudice)

Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489 (2006) (requires on‑the‑record ends‑of‑justice findings and explains excludable delays under the Act)
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972) (four‑factor test for Sixth Amendment speedy‑trial claims)
Hodges v. United States, 408 F.2d 543 (8th Cir. 1969) (calendar congestion responsibility rests with government; shared responsibility among judges)
United States v. Reese, 917 F.3d 177 (3d Cir. 2019) (continuance based on court’s schedule is not excludable under the Speedy Trial Act)
United States v. Gallardo, 773 F.2d 1496 (9th Cir. 1985) (ends‑of‑justice continuance cannot be granted to serve the court’s own scheduling needs)
United States v. Titlbach, 339 F.3d 692 (8th Cir. 2003) (delay approaching a year is presumptively prejudicial)