76 F.4th 1085
8th Cir.2023Background:
- In March 2020 Task Force stopped Rivera at a motel known for drug activity and found 114.4 g methamphetamine, 15.9 g marijuana, scales, baggies, drug paraphernalia, phones with trafficking messages, and cash.
- Rivera was released on bond and in May 2020 FPD surveilled him at a residence; when officers tried to detain/search him he fled, fought officers, grabbed a taser, and attempted to grab an officer’s duty weapon before being subdued.
- A search of Rivera’s car yielded a loaded handgun, a locked safe containing a second firearm, ammunition, baggies, and scales; other backpacks contained drug paraphernalia.
- Rivera pled guilty to possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine; he had prior Arkansas convictions for Accomplice to Robbery and Possession of Methamphetamine with Purpose to Deliver.
- At sentencing the district court designated Rivera a career offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1, and applied a two-level weapons enhancement under § 2D1.1(b)(1) and a two-level reckless-endangerment (flight) enhancement under § 3C1.2.
- Rivera appealed those three rulings; the Eighth Circuit affirmed, applying circuit precedent on career-offender commentary and finding the two enhancements supported by the record.
Issues:
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Rivera’s prior Arkansas Accomplice-to-Robbery conviction qualifies as a § 4B1.1 career-offender predicate | Rivera: accomplice liability is an inchoate/aiding-and-abetting theory not listed in the Guidelines; commentary cannot expand the definition post-Kisor | Government: Eighth Circuit precedent (Mendoza-Figueroa, Stovall) treats accomplice liability/robbery as a crime of violence; commentary has been treated as authoritative | Court: Affirmed career-offender designation; bound by Eighth Circuit precedent (Mendoza-Figueroa / Stovall) and declined to revisit Kisor issue here |
| Whether § 2D1.1(b)(1) weapons enhancement was improper for lack of spatial/temporal nexus | Rivera: firearms found in May are not part of the March offense and thus not connected to the drug offense | Government: defendant exercised control/possession and the May events were relevant conduct in an ongoing course of drug trafficking | Court: Affirmed enhancement; defendant possessed firearms and May events were relevant conduct to his trafficking course |
| Whether § 3C1.2 reckless-endangerment (during flight) enhancement was improper | Rivera: argued the conduct did not qualify as reckless endangerment during flight given immediate tackle and circumstances | Government: resisting arrest/fighting, grabbing taser and attempting to seize a duty weapon created substantial risk to officers/bystanders | Court: Affirmed enhancement; resisting arrest and violent struggle during attempted flight satisfied § 3C1.2 |
Key Cases Cited
- Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36 (1993) (Guidelines commentary treated as agency interpretation entitled to deference)
- Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019) (limits deference to agency interpretations; sets multi-factor test)
- United States v. Mendoza-Figueroa, 65 F.3d 691 (8th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (treats Guidelines commentary as authoritative in career-offender context)
- United States v. Stovall, 921 F.3d 758 (8th Cir. 2019) (Arkansas robbery fits generic federal robbery and is a crime of violence)
- United States v. Anderson, 618 F.3d 873 (8th Cir. 2010) (standards for § 2D1.1(b)(1) weapons enhancement and possession/dominion)
- United States v. Peroceski, 520 F.3d 886 (8th Cir. 2008) (requirement to impose weapons enhancement unless clearly improbable nexus)
- United States v. Ault, 446 F.3d 821 (8th Cir. 2006) (relevant-conduct scope includes conduct beyond the offense of conviction)
- United States v. Bates, 561 F.3d 754 (8th Cir. 2009) (applying reckless-endangerment adjustment to fleeing on foot)
- United States v. McDonald, 521 F.3d 975 (8th Cir. 2008) ("during flight" broadly construed to include resisting arrest)
- United States v. Baca-Valenzuela, 118 F.3d 1223 (8th Cir. 1997) (no separate offense of aiding-and-abetting; accomplice liability results in the same substantive crime)