United States v. Reginald Williams
2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 12465
8th Cir.2015Background
- On Sept. 13, 2012, Williams was arrested in a Days Inn parking lot during a multi-jurisdiction sting targeting online prostitution of a missing Illinois minor; officers found the minor in his motel room and seized a rental car containing a firearm, electronic devices, condoms, and storage media.
- After arrest Detective Slaughter read Miranda rights and Williams orally waived; Williams verbally consented to a search of his rental car in the parking lot and watched the search.
- At police headquarters Slaughter and an FBI agent conducted a recorded interview; Williams gave verbal consent to search the seized electronic devices, which officers searched during the interview.
- More than five hours into the interview Williams refused to sign a written consent form and requested a lawyer; the interview immediately ceased and officers later obtained search warrants for the devices and phone.
- Williams moved to suppress the physical evidence and his statements, arguing coerced consent, lack of Miranda waiver, and an earlier request for counsel; magistrate judge credited officers’ testimony and recommended denial; district court adopted the recommendations.
- Williams was indicted, rejected two plea offers, the government returned a five-count superseding indictment (adding trafficking and 924(c) counts), he was convicted on all counts, and appealed suppression denial and the district court’s failure to dismiss the superseding indictment sua sponte as vindictive prosecution.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Voluntariness of statements / Miranda waiver | Williams: he asked for counsel before the recorded interview and was threatened with obstruction charges to coerce statements; thus waiver and later consents were involuntary | Government: Williams acknowledged Miranda rights, knowingly waived, gave voluntary verbal consents, and requested counsel only at the end, after which questioning stopped | Court: Magistrate’s credibility findings credited officers; no plain error — statements and consents found voluntary |
| Validity of consent to search vehicle/devices and reliance on later warrants | Williams: consent was coerced and evidence from device searches tainted the later warrants (fruit of illegal search) | Government: consent was voluntary; warrants obtained after independent probable cause; defense did not object at trial to admission of seized physical evidence | Court: No plain error in denying suppression; even if some factual phrasing was imperfect, outcome stands; warrants did not require remand |
| Vindictive prosecution (sua sponte dismissal of superseding indictment) | Williams: superseding indictment filed after he refused plea offers shows prosecutorial punishment for exercising right to trial | Government: adding counts followed investigation and prosecutorial discretion; timing alone insufficient to show vindictiveness | Court: No objective evidence of improper motive and timing alone insufficient; no presumption of vindictiveness; failure to dismiss not plain error |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Rodriguez, 484 F.3d 1006 (8th Cir. 2007) (standard of review for suppression findings and plain error when objections forfeited)
- United States v. Thornberg, 676 F.3d 703 (8th Cir. 2012) (forfeiture and plain error review for unraised constitutional claims)
- United States v. LeBrun, 363 F.3d 715 (8th Cir. 2004) (totality-of-circumstances test for voluntariness of statements)
- United States v. Shafer, 608 F.3d 1056 (8th Cir. 2010) (credibility findings after suppression hearing are virtually unassailable on appeal)
- United States v. Chappell, 779 F.3d 872 (8th Cir. 2015) (two routes to show prosecutorial vindictiveness: objective evidence or a presumption based on a reasonable likelihood of vindictiveness)
- United States v. Campbell, 410 F.3d 456 (8th Cir. 2005) (timing alone insufficient to trigger presumption of vindictiveness)
- United States v. Leathers, 354 F.3d 955 (8th Cir. 2004) (vindictive prosecution violates due process; defendant bears heavy burden to prove it)
