United States v. Reese, 326 P.3d 454

In 1992 Reese pled no contest in New Mexico to felony tampering; the district court deferred sentencing, placed him on probation, and later dismissed the charge after he satisfied deferment conditions.
Years later federal agents seized firearms from Reese; a 2011 federal indictment charged, among other counts, three felon-in-possession counts premised on Reese’s 1992 state felony.
Reese moved to dismiss the felon-in-possession counts, arguing that under New Mexico law his civil rights (including the right to hold public office) were restored by operation of law after the deferred sentence dismissal, so he should not be treated as a felon under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) as informed by 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20).
The parties agreed New Mexico restored Reese’s rights to vote, serve on a jury, and possess firearms; they disputed whether the right to hold public office was similarly restored without a gubernatorial pardon or certificate under NMSA § 31-13-1(E).
The Tenth Circuit certified the question to the New Mexico Supreme Court: does completion of a deferred sentence and dismissal restore the right to hold public office automatically, or is a governor’s pardon/certificate required?
The New Mexico Supreme Court held that satisfying a deferred sentence and dismissal restores a person’s civil rights, including the right to hold public office, by operation of law (judicial clemency), without need for a gubernatorial pardon or certificate.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether completion of a deferred sentence/dismissal restores the right to hold public office without a governor’s pardon under § 31-13-1(E) and the New Mexico Constitution	Federal government: a prior conviction remains a conviction for § 922(g)(1) unless state law has restored civil rights; contends holding-office restoration requires gubernatorial action per § 31-13-1(E)	Reese: dismissal after deferred sentence restores civil/political rights (vote and hold office) by operation of law under Art. VII §§1–2 and §31-13-1(A)(1) without a pardon	Court: Completion of deferred sentence and dismissal automatically restores civil rights, including right to hold public office; §31-13-1(E) governs those who served an imposed sentence and seek executive clemency, not those with deferred dismissals.

State v. Serrano, 76 N.M. 655 (N.M. 1966) (describing deferment of sentence as judicial clemency)
State v. Kenneman, 98 N.M. 794 (Ct. App. 1982) (distinguishing deferred sentence from suspended sentence and noting dismissal follows successful deferment)
Padilla v. State, 90 N.M. 664 (N.M. 1977) (addressed prior deferred-sentence conviction in habitual-offender context)
State v. Brothers, 133 N.M. 36 (Ct. App. 2002) (held deferred-sentence dismissal did not necessarily erase conviction notation; addressed SORNA registration context)
United States v. Maines, 20 F.3d 1102 (10th Cir. 1994) (identifies four civil rights whose restoration under state law cause exclusion from § 922(g)(1))
Beecham v. United States, 511 U.S. 368 (U.S. 1994) (interpreting § 921(a)(20) choice-of-law clause)