United States v. Reed, 39 F.4th 1285

Reed, a felon, pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1); plea agreement warned ACCA could raise the mandatory minimum to 15 years.
Reed had prior convictions: three federal drug-distribution counts in a single federal judgment (each dated separately) and a state cocaine-trafficking conviction.
Trial counsel mistakenly advised Reed the three federal convictions in one judgment would count as a single predicate and that ACCA was unlikely to apply; counsel did not promise ACCA would not apply.
After plea, the PSR recommended ACCA treatment based on the three federal drug convictions; Reed obtained new counsel and sought to withdraw his plea, claiming ineffective assistance.
The district court held an evidentiary hearing, found counsel was not constitutionally ineffective (and Reed suffered no Strickland prejudice), overruled ACCA-related objections, and imposed the 15-year ACCA mandatory minimum.
On appeal Reed challenged (1) voluntariness of the plea (ineffective assistance), (2) whether a judge (not a jury) may find prior convictions were committed on “occasions different from one another,” and (3) sufficiency of notice about ACCA exposure. The Tenth Circuit affirmed.

Issue	Reed's Argument	Gov't's Argument	Held
Whether Reed's guilty plea was unknowing/involuntary because trial counsel erroneously downplayed ACCA risk	Counsel’s bad advice made plea unknowing; Reed would have gone to trial but for that advice	Plea colloquy, plea agreement, and repeated warnings of ACCA exposure undercut any reasonable claim he would have insisted on trial; Reed did not prove Strickland prejudice	Affirmed: no Strickland prejudice; plea was knowing/voluntary
Whether judge (not jury) may decide whether prior convictions occurred on "occasions different from one another" for ACCA purposes	Alleyne requires jury finding of any fact that increases mandatory minimums, so a jury must decide the ACCA-occasion question	Apprendi prior-conviction exception and circuit precedent allow the sentencing court to decide such prior-conviction-related issues	Affirmed: Tenth Circuit precedent (Michel) controls—court may decide that question
Whether Reed had insufficient notice (due process) that ACCA might be applied	ACCA not referenced in indictment/arraignment; plea colloquy/ agreement didn’t identify specific predicate convictions, so notice was inadequate	Plea agreement, counsel’s investigation, plea colloquy warnings, and PSR gave actual, timely notice and opportunity to be heard	Affirmed: procedural due process satisfied; Reed had notice and opportunity to object

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (ineffective-assistance two‑part test)
Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (ineffective-assistance standard applied to guilty pleas)
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (facts increasing penalties must be submitted to jury, subject to prior-conviction exception)
Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (facts increasing mandatory minimums must be proved to a jury)
United States v. Michel, 446 F.3d 1122 (10th Cir.) (prior-conviction exception allows judge to resolve whether prior convictions occurred on different occasions)
Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500 (ineffective-assistance claims generally resolved in collateral proceedings)
United States v. Gordon, 4 F.3d 1567 (10th Cir.) (Strickland/Hill framework on direct appeal where record fully developed)
United States v. Moore, 401 F.3d 1220 (10th Cir.) (whether prior conviction qualifies as ACCA "serious drug offense" is a legal question for the court)
United States v. Green, 967 F.2d 459 (10th Cir.) (prior panel discussion of single-judgment convictions)
Wooden v. United States, 142 S. Ct. 1063 (Supreme Court declined to reach whether jury must resolve whether prior crimes occurred on a single occasion)