United States v. Reed
253 F. Supp. 3d 52
| D.D.C. | 2017Background
- James M. Reed was indicted (Dec. 2015) and arrested in the Philippines (Aug. 2016); arraigned in D.D.C. on Oct. 4, 2016; Speedy Trial 70-day clock began then. Multiple agreed exclusions left 26 days run on Count I as of April 3, 2017; Count II’s clock has not yet run because dismissal motions remain pending.
- The Government filed a Superseding Indictment adding Count II on May 4, 2017. Reed filed pretrial motions including motions to dismiss; briefing and a newly asserted Ex Post Facto challenge to Count II made the briefing partially unripe until June 2, 2017.
- The Government moved to continue the June 13, 2017 trial to October 2017 and to exclude the intervening time under the Speedy Trial Act, asserting four essential witnesses would be unavailable for June or the court-proposed alternative August 14 date.
- The four witnesses identified: Dr. Allison Jackson (pediatric expert), HSI Agent Steve Sampilo (Manila case agent), a Rule 414 witness (alleged prior victim and relative), and Agent Keith Cramsey (chain-of-custody/DNA handling).
- The court found three witnesses were "essential" but the Government failed to show any of the four were "unavailable" under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(3) because the Government provided no affidavits and did not show it exercised due diligence (transportation, subpoenas, efforts to alter schedules, etc.).
- The court denied the Government’s request to exclude time under the Speedy Trial Act but, exercising docket-control discretion and given witness scheduling conflicts plus pending motions, continued the trial to August 14, 2017 (without excluding time).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Speedy Trial Act permits tolling for the absence/unavailability of identified witnesses | Gov’t: Four witnesses are essential and unavailable for June/August, so time should be excluded under §3161(h)(3) | Reed: Opposes continuance; asserts Speedy Trial rights and that gov’t hasn’t shown due diligence | Court: Denied exclusion under §3161(h)(3); gov’t failed to prove unavailability or due diligence for each witness |
| Whether the "ends of justice" exclusion §3161(h)(7) justifies tolling | Gov’t: Serious nature of charges and witness issues justify interest-of-justice tolling | Reed: Maintains right to speedy trial; opposes broad tolling absent statutory showing | Court: Denied §3161(h)(7) tolling because gov’t failed the narrower §3161(h)(3) showing and cannot rely on interest-of-justice to fix gov’t shortcomings |
| Whether trial date should be continued even if time is not excluded under the Speedy Trial Act | Gov’t: Scheduling conflicts impede fair trial preparation/presentation | Reed: Asserts speedy-trial prejudice; opposes unnecessary delay | Court: Granted a continuance to August 14, 2017 for docket management and to allow resolution of pending motions, but refused to exclude time under the Act |
| Whether the Government’s motion met the evidentiary/due-diligence burden for unavailable witnesses | Gov’t: Submitted counsel representations of witness scheduling conflicts | Reed: Contends the representations are insufficient; requires affidavits and proof of efforts | Held: Counsel representations were insufficient; statute and case law require affidavits/details showing reasonable efforts (transportation, subpoenas, contacting course admins, etc.) |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. McNeil, 911 F.2d 768 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (defines "essential witness" and permits deference if district court’s finding was reasonable)
- United States v. Burrell, 634 F.3d 284 (5th Cir. 2011) (government must show reasonable efforts/due diligence to secure witnesses)
- United States v. Brown, 819 F.3d 800 (6th Cir. 2016) (subpoena/use of process relevant to unavailability showing)
- United States v. Patterson, 277 F.3d 709 (4th Cir. 2002) (transportation efforts may be required to secure witness)
- United States v. Van Smith, 530 F.3d 967 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (tolling consequences when superseding indictment does not restart Speedy Trial clock for earlier count)
- United States v. Marshall, 935 F.2d 1298 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (treatment of superseding indictments under Speedy Trial Act)
- United States v. Rice, 746 F.3d 1074 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (tolling under §3161(h)(1)(D) while pretrial motions are pending)
- Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489 (2006) (district court may place findings on record prior to ruling on §3162(a)(2) motion)
- Bloate v. United States, 559 U.S. 196 (2010) (clarifies operation of §3161(h)(1)(D) pretrial-motion tolling)