United States v. Raymond Napolitan, 830 F.3d 161

In 2007 police seized nearly a kilogram of cocaine, firearms, and paraphernalia from Napolitan’s home; state convictions (sexual assault and simple assault) followed in 2008.
Under Pennsylvania’s then-operative statute, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9712, the state court increased Napolitan’s mandatory minimum sentence based on a judge’s finding that a firearm was used to intimidate the victim.
In 2011 Napolitan was federally indicted for possession with intent to distribute ≥500g cocaine; convicted and initially sentenced to 78 months, to run consecutively to his state sentence; the sentence was later vacated and remanded for resentencing.
At resentencing the district court (applying a Guidelines enhancement) imposed 90 months and ordered the federal sentence to run consecutively to the state sentence under U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3, finding the offenses distinct.
Napolitan argued on appeal that his state sentence was unconstitutional under Alleyne (because the judge increased the mandatory minimum by a preponderance), so the federal court’s decision to run his federal sentence consecutively was substantively unreasonable.
The Third Circuit held that a defendant cannot collaterally attack a prior state sentence as part of a challenge to the reasonableness of a federal sentence (absent narrow Custis exceptions), and affirmed the consecutive federal sentence.

Issue	Napolitan’s Argument	Government’s Argument	Held
May a defendant, on direct appeal from a federal sentence, collaterally attack the validity of a prior state sentence by arguing a consecutive federal sentence is substantively unreasonable?	The consecutive federal sentence is unreasonable because the state sentence was rendered unconstitutional by Alleyne; under a corrected state sentence the federal sentence would have run concurrently.	Custis and its progeny bar collateral attacks on prior state convictions/sentences in federal sentencing proceedings except for limited exceptions (Gideon denial or explicit statutory/guideline authorization).	No. A defendant may not collaterally attack a prior state sentence in a federal sentencing appeal except under Custis exceptions; the consecutive sentence was not substantively unreasonable.

Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485 (1994) (bars collateral attack on prior state convictions at federal sentencing except for Gideon denial or explicit statutory authorization)
Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013) (fact that increases mandatory minimum is an element requiring proof to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt)
Setser v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 1463 (2012) (district courts have discretion to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences with respect to other proceedings)
Daniels v. United States, 532 U.S. 374 (2001) (state-court convictions have multiple avenues for constitutional challenge; counsel on available remedies)
Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20 (1992) (limits collateral attacks that would strip prior judgments of their force in unrelated proceedings)
Lackawanna Cty. Dist. Att’y v. Coss, 532 U.S. 394 (2001) (plurality on circumstances when prior-conviction challenges may be allowed in federal habeas)