United States v. Raymond Demilia
771 F.3d 1051
8th Cir.2014Background
- On July 17, 2012, Arkansas State Trooper Victor Coleman observed an RV cross the fog line/shoulder multiple times on I-40, activated lights and siren, and stopped the vehicle. Demilia drove; Derrick was a front-seat passenger.
- Coleman asked for license/registration and, after questioning, asked twice to look in the RV; Demilia consented on the second request. The subsequent search uncovered ~759 kg of marijuana.
- Demilia and Derrick moved to suppress evidence from the search. The government’s pre-hearing briefs relied on Arkansas Code §27-51-302 (crossing fog line) and §27-68-103 as bases for the stop, but at the suppression hearing Coleman and the government stated they relied on §103 and disavowed reliance on §302.
- The district court granted suppression, finding §103 could not objectively justify the stop and that the government had abandoned or waived reliance on §302 by affirmatively invoking §103 at the hearing; evidence was suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree.
- The Eighth Circuit reversed, holding (1) an officer’s stated basis or misstatement about the statute is irrelevant if the known facts objectively supply probable cause under another statute, and (2) the government did not waive its §302 argument because it had timely asserted it in pre-hearing briefs and promptly moved to supplement the record after the hearing.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Demilia/Derrick) | Defendant's Argument (Government) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the stop was justified when officer cited §27-68-103 instead of §27-51-302 | Stop invalid because government/ trooper relied on wrong statute at hearing and therefore waived §302; §103 cannot support stop | Facts known to officer (crossing fog line) supplied probable cause under §302 even if officer misstated the statute | The officer’s subjective citation is irrelevant; §302 can supply objective justification and government did not waive the argument |
| Whether the government waived or abandoned its §302 theory by disavowal at hearing | The disavowal prevented defendants from developing record and cross-examining on §302-specific factors; prejudice warrants suppression | Government timely raised §302 in pre-hearing briefs and promptly moved to correct the misstatement; no intentional relinquishment | No waiver: timely pre-hearing briefing and quick post-hearing correction mean no intentional relinquishment; defendants may seek relief on remand if they can show actual prejudice |
| Whether evidence is fruit of the poisonous tree due to invalid stop | Evidence must be suppressed because stop lacked legal basis and waiver foreclosed §302 justification | If §302 provides objective probable cause, the stop was lawful and evidence admissible | Evidence suppression reversed; remand for further proceedings to allow government to rely on §302 unless prejudice shown |
| Standard for reviewing whether officer’s mistaken legal theory defeats probable cause | Misstatement of statute at hearing defeats the stop | Officer’s subjective basis is irrelevant; objective facts control probable-cause inquiry | The court applies objective probable-cause analysis; officer’s subjective belief or citation does not control |
Key Cases Cited
- Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (officer’s subjective intent irrelevant to Fourth Amendment stop)
- Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146 (probable cause judged by facts known, not officer’s stated offense)
- United States v. Guevara, 731 F.3d 824 (Eighth Circuit: stops upheld even when officer cites wrong statute)
- Heien v. North Carolina, 134 S. Ct. 1872 (Supreme Court: reasonable mistakes of law can provide Fourth Amendment cause)
- Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480 (government may be precluded from asserting new legal theories if defendant lacked opportunity to respond)
- United States v. Chavez Loya, 528 F.3d 546 (motion-to-reopen guidance; proffer of new evidence/arguments and reasons for prior omission)