12 F.4th 572
6th Cir.2021Background:
- Raymond Cartwright Jr. was convicted in 2005 of being a felon in possession of a firearm; his PSR listed seven prior offenses as violent-felony ACCA predicates, including first-, second-, and third-degree Tennessee burglary and aggravated assault.
- Johnson v. United States invalidated ACCA’s residual clause, prompting Cartwright to challenge his ACCA status in a successive §2255 petition because some predicates no longer qualified.
- The district court held that, notwithstanding Johnson, Tennessee first- and second-degree burglary were "generic" burglaries and thus remained ACCA predicates; it found third-degree burglary non-generic under prior Sixth Circuit precedent (Cradler).
- The government raised procedural defenses (AEDPA gatekeeping, timeliness, procedural default) and argued Tennessee burglary statutes track generic burglary; Cartwright argued Tennessee law permits convictions for conduct broader than generic burglary (e.g., lawful entry then breaking a receptacle).
- The Sixth Circuit majority concluded Tennessee first- and second-degree burglary are non-generic because Tennessee law and decisions treat the "breaking-after-entry" doctrine (opening receptacles after lawful entry) as part of the burglary offense, so those convictions cannot serve as ACCA predicates.
- Because resolving the burglary-question disposed of the appeal, the court reversed the district court and remanded; procedural-defenses raised by the government were rejected or deemed forfeited.
Issues:
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Cartwright) | Defendant's Argument (Government) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Tenn. 1st- & 2nd-degree burglary are "generic burglary" for ACCA | Statutes permit convictions based on lawful entry followed by opening a receptacle (breaking-after-entry), so they are broader than generic burglary | Statutes "track" the generic definition; breaking-after-entry is a separate, narrower offense or not relevant here | Held: Not generic; Tennessee law (statutes, pattern instructions, and decisions) treats breaking-after-entry as part of burglary, making the statutes broader than generic burglary |
| Whether Cartwright’s successive §2255 is barred by AEDPA gatekeeping | Claim is properly based on Johnson and satisfies §2255(h)(2) | Claim relies primarily on Taylor (an older statutory-interpretation rule), so it is not a Johnson-based new rule | Held: AEDPA gatekeeping does not bar the claim; the petition is properly a Johnson claim (two-step Johnson prejudice analysis applies) |
| Timeliness and procedural default of Cartwright’s burglary challenge | Petitioner timely raised Johnson-based claims and sought amendment to pursue Mathis analysis; government waived procedural-default arguments below | Government: Cartwright’s burglary challenge is untimely or procedurally defaulted for not being raised earlier | Held: Timeliness and default arguments rejected—Cartwright raised the claims timely and the government forfeited a procedural-default defense |
| Precedent conflict: Does United States v. Jones control over later Supreme Court guidance (Descamps) | Descamps and Cradler show that a burglary statute lacking an unlawful-entry element cannot be generic | Jones held Tennessee 2nd-degree burglary was generic; government relies on Jones | Held: Court declines to follow Jones on the breaking/entry issue because Jones assumed (without deciding) the key point and conflicts with Supreme Court precedent (Descamps) |
Key Cases Cited
- Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591 (invalidating ACCA residual clause)
- Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (defining "generic burglary" for ACCA)
- Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (categorical-approach limits to statutory elements)
- Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (state statute lacking an unlawful-entry element cannot be generic burglary)
- Cradler v. United States, 891 F.3d 659 (6th Cir.) (Tenn. 3d-degree burglary non-generic under Tennessee precedent)
- United States v. Jones, 673 F.3d 497 (6th Cir.) (held Tenn. 2d-degree burglary generic as to vehicle/structure issue)
- Williams v. United States, 927 F.3d 427 (6th Cir.) (articulating two-step Johnson habeas analysis)