United States v. Raymond Allen, 716 F.3d 98

In 2010 law enforcement uncovered a multi-county Western North Carolina crack cocaine distribution network; Allen was convicted of conspiring to possess fifty grams or more with intent to distribute under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846, and sentenced to the then-mandatory ten-year minimum.
Allen challenged the conviction on sufficiency grounds, arguing he lacked knowledge of the overarching conspiracy, and challenged pretrial rulings denying access to co-defendant PSRs and admission of expert testimony.
Trial evidence spanned June 2011 and included 27 witnesses, surveillance, recordings, photographs, and a three-tier distribution model culminating in Allen supplying Folston when a higher-up supplier couldn't.
May 17–18, 2010 transactions showed Folston purchasing crack from Allen, with a later shortfall in weight; Folston’s girlfriend Robin Anderson, a government informant, aided surveillance corroborating the transactions.
A jailhouse conversation where Allen acknowledged the broader distribution scheme—‘Set me up’—was offered to show his awareness of the conspiracy.
The court affirmed the conspiracy conviction but vacated the sentence, remanding for resentencing in light of the Fair Sentencing Act’s applicability to post-enactment sentences and subsequent Supreme Court clarification.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Sufficiency of conspiracy knowledge	Allen argues absence of knowledge of the conspiracy beyond two buy-sell transactions.	State that substantial, repeated buy-sell activity shows conspiratorial awareness.	Conspiracy conviction supported by evidence of substantial transactions and awareness.
Pretrial PSR access	Requests in-camera review of co-defendants’ PSRs to probe credibility and bias.	District court properly denied without triggering in-camera review absent specific materialized need.	No abuse of discretion; Trevino standard satisfied; no in-camera PSR review required.
Admission of expert testimony on plea dynamics	Expert could explain plea process implications for credibility of co-defendants.	Expert testimony would usurp court function and is inappropriate under Rule 702.	District court did not abuse discretion; expert testimony properly denied.
Fair Sentencing Act retroactivity and mandatory minimum	FSA increases threshold to 280 grams; Allen’s 99.2 grams means no ten-year minimum.	Bullard controls retroactivity; FSA not retroactive.	Dorsey limited Bullard; FSA applies to post-enactment sentences; district court erred in applying ten-year minimum; remanded for resentencing.

United States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d 849 (4th Cir. 1996) (conspiracy evidence may be circumstantial; slight connection suffices)
United States v. Strickland, 245 F.3d 368 (4th Cir. 2001) (elements of conspiracy; focus on agreement and knowledge)
United States v. Banks, 10 F.3d 1044 (4th Cir. 1993) (conspiracy may be proven with minimal participation)
United States v. Brooks, 662 F.2d 1138 (4th Cir. 1981) (defendant need not know all co-conspirators or details)
United States v. Edmonds, 679 F.3d 169 (4th Cir. 2012) (mere buy-sell evidence alone not enough for conspiracy)
United States v. Mills, 995 F.2d 480 (4th Cir. 1993) (single buy-sell transaction is probative of conspiratorial relationship)
United States v. Reid, 523 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2008) (substantial quantity with buy-sell supports conspiracy inference)
Campbell v. Reed, 594 F.2d 4 (4th Cir. 1979) (reliability of witness credibility and impeachment relevance)
Nimely v. City of New York, 414 F.3d 381 (2d Cir. 2005) (expert credibility evaluations generally inadmissible under Rule 702)
United States v. French, 12 F.3d 114 (8th Cir. 1993) (plea incentives can affect credibility; jury may assess)
United States v. Bullard, 645 F.3d 237 (4th Cir. 2011) (FSA not retroactive as initially held)
Dorsey v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2321 (2012) (FSA applies to sentences after enactment, even if crime occurred earlier)