United States v. Rashad Woodside
895 F.3d 894
6th Cir.2018Background
- Rashad Woodside participated in a multi-person conspiracy to distribute 30-mg oxycodone pills to co-defendants in Middle Tennessee; he pleaded guilty to conspiracy.
- PSR attributed 343,000 pills (≈62,000 kg marijuana equivalent) to Woodside; Woodside objected to the drug-quantity calculation.
- At the original sentencing the government presented testimony from a DEA agent, Stafford, and Breeden; the district court found Woodside responsible for ~28,000 kg marijuana equivalent (≈154,781 pills) and sentenced him to 170 months.
- This Court vacated and remanded because the district court’s math and factual findings re: drug quantity (and whether it included drugs sold by McGregor) were opaque, instructing the court to make findings of fact or recalculate quantity.
- On limited remand the district court issued a written amended judgment explaining its calculation (28,568 kg equiv.), reapplied enhancements/reductions, and again imposed the same 170-month sentence without a new hearing.
- Woodside appealed again raising procedural objections: entitlement to a new sentencing hearing on remand, § 3553(c) violation (reasons not stated in open court), misattribution of McGregor’s drugs, and failure to err on the side of caution in crediting coconspirator testimony.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the limited remand required a new sentencing hearing | Woodside: remand was general and thus entitled him to full resentencing | Government: remand was limited to drug-quantity recalculation and did not require a new hearing | Remand was limited to drug-quantity recalculation; district court did not err by resenting via amended written judgment without a new hearing |
| Whether § 3553(c) required the district court to state reasons in open court on remand | Woodside: § 3553(c) mandates explanation in open court when reasons change | Government: § 3553(c) applies at the time of sentencing (open-court pronouncement); limited remand did not trigger a new sentencing event | No § 3553(c) violation; prior in-court proceedings satisfied procedural requirements because remand was limited and sentence unchanged |
| Whether the court clearly erred by attributing McGregor’s drug sales to Woodside | Woodside: district court improperly held him responsible for McGregor’s sales outside his agreement | Government: even if misattributed, harmless because quantities attributable to Woodside alone support same guideline level | Any misattribution was harmless: uncontested quantities from periods after McGregor ceased sales (and conservative assumptions) still yield the same base offense level |
| Whether the court abused discretion by crediting Stafford over Breeden or failing to "err on side of caution" | Woodside: court should have credited lower testimony and erred conservatively | Government: testimony largely corroborative; small differences don’t affect guideline range | No clear error; choice between witnesses did not change guideline range and the court expressly erred conservatively in several respects |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Garcia-Robles, 640 F.3d 159 (6th Cir. 2011) (limited remand constrains district court to issues identified on remand)
- United States v. Jeross, 521 F.3d 562 (6th Cir. 2008) (district court may rely on procedural rights satisfied at original sentencing on limited remand)
- United States v. Orlando, 363 F.3d 596 (6th Cir. 2004) (limited remand language can appear anywhere in opinion and must clearly convey intent to limit scope)
- Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007) (examples of procedural sentencing error and need for adequate explanation of chosen sentence)
- United States v. Woodside, [citation="642 F. App'x 490"] (6th Cir. 2016) (prior panel opinion vacating sentence for lack of transparent drug-quantity calculation)