United States v. Rashad Wearing
2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 16862
| 8th Cir. | 2016Background
- Rashad Wearing, a federal inmate at FCI–Forrest City, was found on April 24, 2013, with a five-inch taped plastic shank and placed in administrative segregation the same day.
- Prison officials referred the matter to the U.S. Attorney on May 8, 2013; a federal indictment was returned April 2, 2014.
- Wearing moved to dismiss the indictment on Speedy Trial Act and Sixth Amendment speedy-trial grounds and separately for alleged insufficiency of the indictment.
- The district court denied both motions: it held administrative segregation was not an ‘‘arrest’’ under the Speedy Trial Act and, under Barker, Wearing’s Sixth Amendment right was not violated.
- The district court also held the indictment adequately notified Wearing that the offense occurred in a prison and described the prohibited object.
- Wearing appealed; the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denials.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether placement in administrative segregation constitutes an "arrest" that triggers the 30-day indictment requirement of the Speedy Trial Act | Wearing: segregation was an arrest on April 24, 2013, so indictment more than 30 days later violated §3161(b) | Government: segregation without a complaint/charge is not an arrest for §3161(b) purposes | Held: not an arrest under the Speedy Trial Act; §3161(b) starts when criminal charge/complaint is filed or other arrest tied to charge occurs |
| Whether administrative segregation started the Sixth Amendment speedy-trial clock (and whether delay violated Sixth Amendment / warranted dismissal under Rule 48(b)) | Wearing: Sixth Amendment right attached on April 24, 2013 when placed in segregation, so 13-month delay violated right and warrants dismissal | Government: segregation is disciplinary/administrative, not a prosecution-related arrest; Sixth Amendment did not attach until indictment | Held: administrative segregation is not an arrest for Sixth Amendment purposes; Sixth Amendment protections had not yet attached, so no violation and Rule 48(b) dismissal not warranted |
| Whether the indictment was constitutionally and procedurally sufficient for failing to allege the offense occurred in a federal prison as required by §1791(d)(4) | Wearing: indictment failed to allege essential element that offense occurred in a federal prison | Government: indictment described date, place (Eastern District of Arkansas) and prison status (Wearing was an inmate at a federal facility), giving adequate notice | Held: indictment adequate under Rule 7(c) and Debrow/Tebeau; notice sufficient and any omission was marginal, not fatal |
Key Cases Cited
- Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972) (framework for Sixth Amendment speedy-trial analysis)
- United States v. Piggie, 316 F.3d 789 (8th Cir. 2003) (Speedy Trial Act definitions discussion)
- United States v. Jones, 676 F.2d 327 (8th Cir. 1982) (thirty-day period tied to charging/complaint)
- United States v. Peterson, 698 F.2d 921 (8th Cir. 1982) (similar rule on commencement of §3161(b) period)
- United States v. Abernathy, 688 F.2d 576 (8th Cir. 1982) (post-Jones detention not an "arrest" for §3161(b) absent complaint)
- United States v. Sprouts, 282 F.3d 1037 (8th Cir. 2002) (Sixth Amendment attaches at arrest or indictment, whichever first)
- United States v. Mills, 641 F.2d 785 (9th Cir. 1981) (administrative segregation not an arrest for Sixth Amendment)
- United States v. Clardy, 540 F.2d 439 (9th Cir. 1976) (same)
- United States v. Duke, 527 F.2d 386 (5th Cir. 1976) (administrative segregation is disciplinary/administrative, not prosecution-dependent)
- United States v. Hance, 501 F.3d 900 (8th Cir. 2007) (standard of review for indictment sufficiency)
- United States v. Tebeau, 713 F.3d 955 (8th Cir. 2013) (indictment ordinarily sufficient if it tracks statutory language)
- United States v. Huggans, 650 F.3d 1210 (8th Cir. 2011) (notice sufficiency test for indictments)
- United States v. Carlson, 697 F.2d 231 (8th Cir. 1983) (Rule 48(b) dismissal review; Sixth Amendment protection activates when prosecution begins)