111 F.4th 392
4th Cir.2024Background
- Randy Price was indicted on two counts: possession of a firearm with an obliterated serial number (18 U.S.C. § 922(k)) and felon-in-possession (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)) after police found a handgun with an obliterated serial number in his vehicle.
- After Bruen, Price moved to dismiss both counts as facially unconstitutional under the Second Amendment; the district court dismissed the § 922(k) count but upheld the § 922(g)(1) count.
- The government appealed the dismissal of § 922(k); the Fourth Circuit heard the case en banc.
- The principal legal question: whether § 922(k)’s ban on possessing firearms with removed, altered, or obliterated serial numbers falls within the Second Amendment’s protection under the Bruen framework.
- The Fourth Circuit majority held that firearms with obliterated serial numbers are not "in common use for lawful purposes," so § 922(k) does not implicate the Amendment and is constitutional; the court reversed the district court and remanded.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 922(k) regulates conduct covered by the Second Amendment's plain text | Price: statute criminalizes possession of an "Arm" and thus falls within the Amendment; must be dismissed facially | Government: firearms with obliterated serial numbers are not "arms in common use" for lawful purposes and so are outside the Amendment's scope | Court: § 922(k) regulates firearms not in common lawful use; thus Second Amendment does not cover them and statute is constitutional (reversed dismissal) |
| Whether the proper Bruen inquiry places "common use" at step one (text) or step two (history) | Price: common-use limitation is part of textual inquiry; thus burden on challenger to show common lawful use | Government: common-use analysis and historical analogues belong to government at step two; government must justify regulation historically | Majority: addresses common-use at step one (finding no common lawful use); separate concurrences and dissent dispute placement but majority outcome stands |
| Whether statute can be rejected on a facial challenge given Price’s status as a violent felon | Price: brings facial challenge to § 922(k) (broad relief sought) | Government / some concurrences: because Price is a violent felon permanently barred from firearm possession, he cannot show § 922(k) is invalid in all its applications; facial challenge fails | Concurrence (separate): would have resolved by noting Price’s felon status defeats facial challenge; majority reached merits and upheld § 922(k) on common-use grounds |
| Whether government met its burden to show historical analogues justifying § 922(k) (if text covered the conduct) | Price: no historical tradition supports banning possession based on serial-number status | Government: regulation fits within tradition of banning dangerous/unusual arms and within inspection/marking and anti-trafficking analogues | Majority: did not need step-two analogues because weapon type is outside text; several concurring/dissenting opinions dispute whether government met historical-analogue burden |
Key Cases Cited
- District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (establishes individual right to possess firearms for self-defense and that weapons not in common lawful use may be unprotected)
- New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022) (sets the text-and-history framework for Second Amendment challenges)
- United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939) (holds that the Second Amendment does not necessarily protect weapons not part of ordinary military equipment or common use)
- United States v. Rahimi, 144 S. Ct. 1889 (2024) (clarifies that government must show a regulation is consistent with historical regulatory principles and that history helps delineate contours of the right)
- United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85 (3d Cir. 2010) (pre-Bruen case analyzing § 922(k) and reasoning that unmarked firearms serve primarily illicit purposes)
- Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932) (test for whether two statutory offenses are the same offense for double jeopardy purposes)