United States v. Randall Sutton, 862 F.3d 547

Randall Sutton committed four armed bank robberies in 2005 (one in Kentucky, three in Ohio); indicted in Eastern District of Kentucky (Kentucky charge) and Southern District of Ohio (Ohio charges).
Sutton agreed to plead guilty and signed a Rule 20 consent to transfer the Kentucky charge to the Southern District of Ohio; he pleaded guilty in Ohio to Ohio counts and agreed in writing to disposition of the Kentucky count, but never formally entered a guilty plea to the Kentucky indictment after transfer.
Despite no formal Kentucky plea, the Southern District of Ohio sentenced Sutton on both Ohio and Kentucky charges in 2007; Sutton did not object at the time and pursued direct appeals.
In 2012 Sutton filed a §2255 motion in the Southern District of Ohio; in 2015 that court vacated his conviction and sentence on the Kentucky charge and returned the case to the Eastern District of Kentucky under Rule 20.
Sutton pleaded not guilty in the Eastern District of Kentucky in January–February 2016, moved to dismiss alleging Speedy Trial Act (STA) and Sixth Amendment violations based on delay, the district court denied the motion, Sutton pled guilty to one Kentucky §924(c) count preserving appeal; court sentenced him to the original sentence; this appeal followed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (United States)	Defendant's Argument (Sutton)	Held
When did the Speedy Trial Act 70‑day clock begin after Sutton's collateral vacation of his Kentucky plea?	The STA clock began when Sutton first appeared in the Eastern District of Kentucky (Jan 20, 2016) /or when jurisdiction was restored to that court.	The STA clock began earlier — either when Sutton pleaded in Ohio (Feb 15, 2007) or at sentencing (Aug 29, 2007) — so the 70‑day limit was exceeded.	Court held §3161(e) governs (analogous to Bond/Mack): clock begins when the district court regains jurisdiction; here that was Dec 23, 2015 (Rule 20 paperwork return), and excludable time left trial within 70 days — no STA violation.
Whether Sutton's Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial was violated by the ~10+ year delay	Delay is attributable in part to procedural errors but Sutton had originally chosen to plead guilty, waited years before asserting rights, and suffered no demonstrated prejudice.	The lengthy delay (indictment in 2005 to arraignment ~2016) and government/court negligence violated his Sixth Amendment right.	Applying Barker factors, court found length presumptively prejudicial but reason for delay neutral (shared fault), late assertion by Sutton and lack of prejudice — on balance no Sixth Amendment violation; affirmed.

O’Dell v. United States, 154 F.3d 358 (6th Cir. 1998) (interpreting §3161(c)(1) to apply only when a not‑guilty plea was entered)
United States v. Bond, 956 F.2d 628 (6th Cir. 1992) (§3161(e) applies when a guilty plea is vacated on collateral attack)
United States v. Lopez‑Valenzuela, 511 F.3d 487 (5th Cir. 2007) (the not‑guilty plea determines applicability of §3161(c)(1) but not necessarily the commencement date)
United States v. Mack, 669 F.2d 28 (1st Cir. 1982) (legislative‑history‑based view that §3161(e) governs when guilty pleas are vacated)
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972) (four‑factor test for Sixth Amendment speedy‑trial claims)
Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647 (1992) (lengthy delay can be presumptively prejudicial and informs Barker analysis)