United States v. Ralph Dennis
2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 11572
| 3rd Cir. | 2016Background
- ATF ran a reverse-sting “stash house” operation after an informant, Kevin Burk, identified Ralph Dennis as a potential participant; agents posed as a cartel courier (“Rock”).
- Burk, a friend of Dennis and a cooperating informant, recruited Dennis, set up meetings, and told a story invoking his sick mother and a large drug payoff; Burk supplied a firearm to Dennis near the operation date.
- Dennis attended multiple meetings, discussed plans (roles, weapons, tying guards, repackaging cocaine), recruited John Mitchell and Terrance Hardee, and participated in a rehearsal; agents then arrested the group before any real robbery occurred.
- At trial Dennis was convicted of: Count I (conspiracy to rob a stash house, 18 U.S.C. §1951), Count II (drug conspiracy, 21 U.S.C. §841), and Count III (carrying a firearm during a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. §924(c)). He received a 180‑month sentence.
- Dennis requested a jury instruction on entrapment and moved to dismiss for outrageous prosecution; the district court denied both (finding predisposition and no shocking government conduct). Dennis appealed.
- The Third Circuit held that Dennis met his burden to trigger an entrapment instruction as to the robbery and firearm counts (inducement + lack of predisposition), vacated those convictions and remanded for a new trial, but affirmed the drug conviction and denied dismissal for outrageous prosecution.
Issues
| Issue | Dennis' Argument | Government's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether defendant was entitled to entrapment jury instruction on robbery and firearms counts | Burk and ATF induced him (friendship, sick‑mother plea, informant’s persistent recruitment, supply of gun); Dennis lacked predisposition (no violent/robbery history, refused prior robberies, low IQ) | Government: operation was a reverse sting that only provided opportunity; Dennis showed predisposition (criminal record, long association with Burk, active and eager participation) | Reversed convictions on robbery and §924(c); remanded for new trial on those counts (court erred by weighing evidence and denying instruction) |
| Whether entrapment instruction was required for drug conspiracy count | Same inducement argument as above applied to all counts | Government: evidence of prior drug convictions and distribution predisposed Dennis to drug trafficking; therefore no entrapment instruction on drug count | Affirmed drug conviction; defendant failed to show lack of predisposition for drug offense |
| Whether prosecution was so outrageous as to dismiss indictment (due process) | Government created the crime and induced participation for conviction; tactics were shocking | Government: conduct did not reach the extreme standard; similar reverse stings have been upheld; entrapment alone is insufficient for dismissal | Denied dismissal; conduct, while questionable, did not meet the exceedingly high standard for outrageous prosecution |
| Whether district court’s pre‑verdict weighing of entrapment evidence was permissible | Dennis: district court improperly weighed evidence and drew adverse inferences when deciding whether to give instruction | Government: district court may weigh evidence presented at trial (Marino) and the error, if any, was harmless because jury heard all evidence | Court held district court improperly weighed evidence and invaded jury province re: robbery/firearms; error not harmless as government would have borne burden beyond reasonable doubt if instruction given |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578 (3d Cir.) (en banc) (defines entrapment framework)
- United States v. Mathews, 485 U.S. 58 (1988) (mere opportunity to commit crime is not inducement)
- United States v. Fedroff, 874 F.2d 178 (3d Cir. 1989) (examples of government conduct that may constitute inducement)
- United States v. Wright, 921 F.2d 42 (3d Cir. 1990) (two‑part entrapment test: inducement and predisposition)
- United States v. El‑Gawli, 837 F.2d 142 (3d Cir. 1988) (burden of production for entrapment instruction)
- United States v. Marino, 868 F.2d 549 (3d Cir. 1989) (distinguishing when solicitation is mere opportunity vs. inducement)
- United States v. Blitch, 773 F.3d 837 (7th Cir. 2014) (reverse‑sting facts; government solicitation may be ordinary opportunity)
- United States v. Mayfield, 771 F.3d 417 (7th Cir. 2014) (en banc) (sustained inducement where persistent recruitment of reluctant defendant occurred)
- Government of Virgin Islands v. Toto, 529 F.2d 278 (3d Cir. 1976) (harmless‑error standard for entitlement to jury instruction)
- United States v. Beverly, 723 F.2d 11 (3d Cir. 1983) (outrageous‑prosecution standard; reverse stings often permissible)
- United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973) (Supreme Court guidance limiting judicial veto of law enforcement practices)