United States v. Rahimi
61 F.4th 443
5th Cir.2023Background
- Between Dec 2020 and Jan 2021 Rahimi was identified in multiple shootings; police executed a warrant at his home and found a pistol and rifle which he admitted possessing.
- Rahimi was subject to a Texas agreed civil protective order (entered Feb 5, 2020) that expressly prohibited firearm possession.
- He was indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) (possession of a firearm while subject to a qualifying domestic-violence restraining order); he moved to dismiss on Second Amendment grounds, but pled guilty after the district court denied the motion.
- On appeal a prior Fifth Circuit panel relied on pre‑Bruen precedent (Emerson/McGinnis) to uphold § 922(g)(8); that opinion was withdrawn after the Supreme Court decided Bruen and the case was rebriefed.
- Applying Bruen’s historical‑tradition test, the Fifth Circuit held that the Government failed to identify historical analogues that were “relevantly similar” and comparably justified, so § 922(g)(8) is inconsistent with the Second Amendment.
- Result: the court reversed and vacated Rahimi’s conviction under § 922(g)(8).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 922(g)(8) is facially constitutional under the Second Amendment | § 922(g)(8) valid to protect victims and public safety; pre‑Bruen precedent upholds it | § 922(g)(8) is facially unconstitutional under Bruen’s historical‑tradition test | § 922(g)(8) is unconstitutional; conviction vacated |
| Whether Rahimi is among “the people” protected by the Second Amendment | He is not an “ordinary, law‑abiding” citizen and so falls outside the Amendment’s scope | Rahimi is part of “the people” and entitled to Second Amendment protection absent historical rule to the contrary | Rahimi falls within “the people”; the statute must be justified historically |
| Proper analytical framework post‑Bruen | Means‑end scrutiny and Emerson/McGinnis approach validate § 922(g)(8) | Bruen replaces means‑end scrutiny with a historical‑analogue inquiry; Emerson/McGinnis are no longer controlling | Bruen’s text + historical‑tradition test governs; means‑end scrutiny disallowed |
| Whether historical analogues justify § 922(g)(8) (Government’s burden) | Pointed to disarmament of “dangerous” classes, colonial/state “going armed” laws, and surety laws as analogues | These precedents are not relev antly similar in how or why they burdened arms rights | Government’s analogues fail; surety laws closest but did not impose total possession bans, so § 922(g)(8) is unlike historical tradition |
Key Cases Cited
- N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n, Inc. v. Bruen, 142 S. Ct. 2111 (2022) (establishes historical‑tradition test and rejects means‑end scrutiny for Second Amendment challenges)
- District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (recognizes an individual right to keep and bear arms and identifies presumptively lawful prohibitions)
- McGinnis v. United States, 956 F.3d 747 (5th Cir. 2020) (Fifth Circuit applied two‑step means‑end scrutiny to uphold § 922(g)(8) pre‑Bruen)
- Emerson v. United States, 270 F.3d 203 (5th Cir. 2001) (early Fifth Circuit decision addressing individual Second Amendment rights and upholding § 922(g)(8) as applied)
- Salerno v. United States, 481 U.S. 739 (1987) (articulates facial‑challenge standard cited by the Government)
- McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010) (incorporates the Second Amendment against the states and discusses historical scope of rights)