United States v. Rafael Ortega, 706 F. App'x 166

Defendants Rafael Ortega and Baltazar Ibarra Cardona were convicted by a jury of conspiracy and multiple counts of possession with intent to distribute 1,000 kg or more of marijuana; both appealed.
Ortega challenged the jury verdict form, arguing it constructively amended the superseding indictment by omitting the word "intentionally" from the drug-quantity interrogatories, thus broadening the mens rea from the grand-jury allegations.
The superseding indictment charged Ortega with acting "knowingly and intentionally." The general guilt questions on the verdict form tracked that language, but the quantity interrogatories used only "knowingly."
The court observed that drug statutes are disjunctive and may be pleaded conjunctively and proved disjunctively; the jury was also instructed that "knowingly" means voluntarily and intentionally, so a finding of knowing encompassed intentional conduct.
Ibarra challenged limitations on cross-examining a government witness (codefendant Francisco Colin) about potential benefits tied to a separate state case, arguing those limits prevented exposing Colin’s bias and motive to the jury.
The court found no record evidence showing a link between Colin’s testimony here and any state-case benefits; Colin was otherwise thoroughly questioned about his plea and incentives, so any restriction did not create a Confrontation Clause violation.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the verdict form constructively amended the indictment	Ortega: omission of "intentionally" in quantity interrogatories allowed conviction on a broader, uncharged mens rea	Government: general guilt questions included "knowingly and intentionally;" quantity interrogatories affect sentencing, not the charged offense; jury instruction equated knowingly with intentional	No constructive amendment; conviction affirmed
Whether disjunctive statutory elements required conjunctive pleading to be fatal	Ortega: indictment’s conjunctive wording combined elements improperly	Government: disjunctive statutes may be pleaded conjunctively and proved disjunctively	Court: pleading was permissible; no error
Whether limiting cross-examination about state-case benefits violated Confrontation Clause	Ibarra: limits prevented showing Colin’s bias/motive tied to evading state charges or receiving credit for testifying	Government: record lacked evidence of a connection; limits were reasonable and Colin’s plea/benefits were explored	No constitutional violation; limitations not reversible error
Whether excluded inquiry would have materially altered juror impression of witness credibility	Ibarra: excluded topic would have produced materially different view of Colin	Government: only conjecture offered; record showed no link or government influence	Court: defendant failed to show reasonable juror would view witness differently; affirmed

Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212 (constructive amendment principle protecting grand-jury charging function)
United States v. Nuñez, 180 F.3d 227 (reversal standard when jury instructions allow conviction of unindicted crime)
United States v. Daniels, 723 F.3d 562 (distinguishing quantity findings that affect sentence from elements required for conviction)
United States v. Haymes, 610 F.2d 309 (disjunctive statutes may be pleaded conjunctively and proved disjunctively)
Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 (Confrontation Clause and permissible limits on cross-examination)