United States v. Rafael Diaz-Morales
664 F. App'x 871
| 11th Cir. | 2016Background
- Diaz-Morales pleaded guilty to illegal re-entry and was sentenced to 57 months based on a Guidelines enhancement under USSG § 2L1.2 for a prior Florida burglary conviction treated as "burglary of a dwelling."
- With the enhancement his Guidelines range was 57–71 months; without it the range would have been 24–30 months.
- He had been in custody since May 2013 and had served 42 months when this opinion issued.
- On direct appeal the Eleventh Circuit initially reviewed his unpreserved challenge for plain error and affirmed because there was then no controlling precedent holding Florida burglary indivisible.
- The Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated, and remanded in light of Mathis; on remand this Court follows its subsequent decision in United States v. Esprit concluding the Florida burglary statute is indivisible and broader than the federal generic burglary-of-a-dwelling definition.
- The Court therefore vacated the sentence and remanded for expedited resentencing, noting Diaz-Morales may be eligible for immediate release if resentenced within the lower range.
Issues
| Issue | Diaz-Morales' Argument | Government's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Florida burglary is a categorical match to federal "burglary of a dwelling" for USSG § 2L1.2 enhancement | Florida burglary is broader and not a categorical match; statute not divisible | The district court properly applied the conviction to enhance because Florida burglary fits § 2L1.2 | Held for Diaz-Morales: Florida statute is indivisible and broader; not a categorical match |
| Whether the modified categorical approach could be used | Can't use it because Florida statute is not divisible | The government argued the enhancement was permissible (and the district court applied it) | Held that modified categorical approach is unavailable; conviction cannot be assumed to be for burglary of a dwelling |
| Standard of review (plain error) for unpreserved objection | Error should be plain given intervening precedent (Esprit/Mathis) | Previously argued no plain error; earlier affirmance due to lack of binding precedent | Held plain error exists because intervening, controlling authority made the error plain and it affected substantial rights |
| Prejudice/remedy — whether sentence must be vacated and resentenced expeditiously | The erroneous higher Guidelines range likely affected the sentence; resentencing warranted and should be expedited | Government implicitly argued sentence should stand or that error was not prejudicial | Held sentence vacated; remand for expedited resentencing; noted defendant may be immediately releasable if resentenced within correct range |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Estrella, 758 F.3d 1239 (11th Cir. 2014) (discusses categorical approach to prior convictions under § 2L1.2)
- United States v. Palomino Garcia, 606 F.3d 1317 (11th Cir. 2010) (applies categorical-approach precedents to § 2L1.2)
- United States v. Lockett, 810 F.3d 1262 (11th Cir. 2016) (addresses assumptions about convictions under broader state statutes)
- United States v. Frazier, 605 F.3d 1271 (11th Cir. 2010) (explains plain-error test)
- United States v. Bennett, 472 F.3d 825 (11th Cir. 2006) (discusses reversal for errors affecting fairness and integrity of proceedings)
- United States v. Pielago, 135 F.3d 703 (11th Cir. 1998) (recognizes intervening controlling precedent can make an error plain)