United States v. Quentin Tidwell
2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 12128
| 8th Cir. | 2016Background
- Quentin Tidwell pleaded guilty to conspiring to distribute >280g crack; mandatory minimum 120 months. Sentenced initially to 135 months, later reduced to 94 months on a post‑sentence Rule 35 motion for substantial assistance.
- Tidwell filed a § 2255 motion alleging incorrect criminal history calculation (a 1992 conviction wrongly counted). District court vacated the sentence and ordered de novo resentencing after Amendment 782’s effective date.
- A revised PSR removed the 1992 points but added three criminal history points for a September 2013 Arkansas conviction (drug, firearms, and misdemeanor animal cruelty) arising from Tidwell’s Feb 16, 2012 arrest.
- At resentencing the district court: (1) counted the 2013 conviction as a “prior sentence” under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(a)(1); (2) found the 2013 conduct not to be “relevant conduct” to the federal conspiracy; (3) granted a 30% substantial‑assistance reduction and applied it to the 120‑month statutory minimum, yielding an 84‑month sentence.
- Tidwell appealed arguing (a) a conviction imposed after the original sentencing should not be counted at resentencing, and (b) the 2013 conviction was relevant conduct and therefore not a separate prior sentence. The Eighth Circuit affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Tidwell's Argument | Government's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a conviction imposed after the original sentencing but before de novo resentencing under § 2255 may be counted as a "prior sentence" for criminal history | Post‑sentencing conviction should not count because "prior sentence" means prior to the original vacated sentence (relying on Ticchiarelli) | District court may reassess criminal history at de novo resentencing; Pepper permits considering subsequent events; the 2013 conviction was a prior sentence at time of resentencing | Affirmed: court may count a conviction imposed after the original sentencing when conducting a de novo § 2255 resentencing; no procedural error in counting the 2013 conviction |
| Whether the conduct underlying the 2013 conviction was "relevant conduct" (thus excluded from prior‑sentence points) to the federal conspiracy | The 2013 drug and firearm conduct occurred close in time and were part of the conspiracy period, so it is relevant conduct and not a distinct prior sentence | Government conceded some of the conduct was relevant but argued at least the misdemeanor animal cruelty was unrelated; district court found the 2013 conduct involved different drugs, occurred after the conspiracy end date, and was severable | Affirmed: no clear error in district court’s factual determination that the 2013 conviction was for severable, distinct conduct and therefore properly counted as a prior sentence |
Key Cases Cited
- Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476 (2011) (district court may consider post‑sentencing developments at resentencing)
- United States v. Ticchiarelli, 171 F.3d 24 (1st Cir. 1999) (post‑sentencing convictions not to be treated as prior sentences on remand)
- United States v. Diaz, 546 F.3d 566 (8th Cir. 2008) (applying § 5G1.1(b) when mandatory minimum controls guidelines start point)
- United States v. Pinkin, 675 F.3d 1088 (8th Cir. 2012) (test for whether prior conviction is "relevant conduct" versus a distinct prior sentence)
- United States v. Parker, 762 F.3d 801 (8th Cir. 2014) (§ 2255 resentencing may vacate and reconfigure sentence under § 3553(a))
- United States v. Flowers, 995 F.2d 315 (1st Cir. 1993) (Guidelines treat prior sentences by date imposed, not date of underlying conduct)
- United States v. Williams, 474 F.3d 1130 (8th Cir. 2007) (a sentence below the mandatory minimum must be based exclusively on assistance‑related considerations)