United States v. Puma
Criminal No. 2021-0454
| D.D.C. | Mar 19, 2022Background
- Defendant Anthony Puma is indicted for (1) obstruction of an official proceeding (18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2)) and aiding/abetting, (2) entering/remaining in a restricted building (18 U.S.C. § 1752(a)(1)), and (3) disorderly/disruptive conduct in a restricted building (18 U.S.C. § 1752(a)(2)) for conduct at the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021.
- Government alleges Puma traveled to D.C., entered the Capitol (including scaling a wall and entering via a breached window), livestreamed, and posted social-media statements before and after January 6 encouraging force and describing his presence inside the building.
- Puma moved to dismiss Counts One–Three arguing: the Electoral College certification is not an "official proceeding" under § 1512; § 1512(c)(2) is unconstitutionally vague ("corruptly" and the residual "otherwise" clause); § 1752 requires Secret Service designation of a restricted area; and the Vice President(s) were not "temporarily visiting" the Capitol.
- The court reviewed controlling statutory text, precedent from other D.D.C. judges, and legislative history in denying the motion.
- Ruling: the court found the indictment adequately alleges § 1512(c)(2) obstruction of Congress’s electoral-certification proceeding, rejected Puma’s vagueness challenges, and held § 1752 covers the Capitol without a Secret Service designation and that the Vice President’s presence qualified as "temporarily visiting." Motion to dismiss Counts One–Three denied.
Issues
| Issue | Gov't Argument | Puma's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Congress’s Electoral College certification is an "official proceeding" under § 1512(c)(2) | Certification is a formal, statutory/constitutional joint session of Congress and falls within § 1515(a)(1)(B) | Certification is a ministerial/ceremonial act not the type of adjudicative proceeding § 1512 protects | Held: Certification is an "official proceeding" (formal assembly akin to a hearing); indictment adequate |
| Whether § 1512(c)(2) is unconstitutionally vague ("corruptly") | "Corruptly" has settled legal meaning (improper purpose/dishonesty); cases interpret it to require consciousness of wrongdoing | "Corruptly" is vague as applied to Puma (his actions were trespass, not clearly obstructive) and Poindexter limits use of "corruptly" | Held: Term "corruptly" and statute are not unconstitutionally vague as applied to the indictment; factual culpability is for trial |
| Whether § 1512(c)(2)’s "otherwise" residual clause is unconstitutionally vague/overbroad | "Otherwise" allows obstruction by means other than document destruction; statute’s structure supports broad reach | "Otherwise" creates ambiguity; Begay/lenity require narrowing to acts like (c)(1) | Held: "Otherwise" is sufficiently clear; no rule of lenity problem; (c)(2) covers non-document obstruction |
| Whether § 1752 requires Secret Service designation and whether protectees were "temporarily visiting" | § 1752's text covers any "posted, cordoned off, or otherwise restricted area" where a protectee "is or will be temporarily visiting"; it does not require Secret Service to do the restricting; VP Pence was temporarily visiting the Capitol | Section requires Secret Service restriction; VP Pence/Harris had permanent offices in D.C. and thus were not "temporarily visiting" | Held: No Secret Service-designation requirement; Capitol was a restricted area while VP Pence was present and Pence qualified as "temporarily visiting"; § 1752 applies |
Key Cases Cited
- Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337 (1997) (statutory interpretation begins with plain text)
- Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528 (2015) (legislative purpose may inform but not override textual limits)
- United States v. Poindexter, 951 F.2d 369 (D.C. Cir. 1991) ("corruptly" vagueness concerns in § 1505 as-applied challenge)
- Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696 (2005) ("corruptly" can be a constitutionally adequate standard)
- Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591 (2015) (void-for-vagueness doctrine and residual-clause analysis)
- Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137 (2008) (residual-clause interpretation informing similarity requirement)
- United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593 (1995) ("consciousness of wrongdoing" standard in obstruction statutes)
- United States v. Ermoian, 752 F.3d 1165 (9th Cir. 2014) (defining "official proceeding" in agency context)
- United States v. Shotts, 145 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 1998) (construing "corruptly persuade" as "improper purpose")