596 F.Supp.3d 90
D.D.C.2022Background
- Defendant Anthony Puma was indicted for: (1) obstruction of an official proceeding under 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2) (and aiding and abetting), (2) entering/remaining in a restricted building, and (3) disorderly/disruptive conduct in a restricted building under 18 U.S.C. § 1752.
- Allegations: Puma traveled to D.C. for January 6, 2021, entered the Capitol through a breached window, encouraged others to advance, and posted/streamed statements before and after the event suggesting violent intent.
- Puma moved to dismiss Counts One–Three arguing: (a) the Electoral College certification is not an "official proceeding" under § 1512; (b) § 1512(c)(2) is unconstitutionally vague ("corruptly" and residual language); (c) § 1752 requires the Secret Service to designate restricted areas; and (d) the Vice President (and VP-elect) were not "temporarily visiting" the Capitol.
- The government opposed, relying on statutory definitions (18 U.S.C. § 1515) and precedent interpreting § 1512 and § 1752 to cover congressional certification and Capitol-restricted-area prosecutions.
- The court treated factual allegations as background but limited legal review to the four corners of the indictment and prior authority.
- Ruling: Judge Paul L. Friedman denied Puma’s motion, holding the indictment adequate and rejecting Puma’s statutory and vagueness challenges.
Issues
| Issue | Government's Argument | Puma's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Congress’ certification of Electoral College votes is an "official proceeding" under § 1512(c)(2) | Certification is a formal congressional proceeding within § 1515(a)(1)(B) and has the trappings of a hearing mandated by Constitution/statute | The certification is merely ceremonial/ministerial and not the kind of adjudicative proceeding § 1512 protects | Held: Certification is an "official proceeding"; §1515(B) covers the joint session and count |
| Whether § 1512(c)(2) is unconstitutionally vague ("corruptly") | "Corruptly" has settled legal meanings (dishonesty/improper purpose/consciousness of wrongdoing); courts have cabined Poindexter | Term is vague as applied to Puma’s alleged trespass and statements; residual "otherwise" is ambiguous | Held: §1512(c)(2) is not unconstitutionally vague on its face or as applied at motion-to-dismiss stage; factual disputes reserved for trial |
| Whether the word "otherwise" in § 1512(c)(2) requires a nexus to documents/records | "Otherwise" covers obstruction by means other than document destruction; structure and history show broad reach | "Otherwise" should be limited by (c)(1); Begay-like narrowing required | Held: Court rejects narrow Begay-style limit; subsection (c)(2) reaches obstructive acts beyond document-related conduct |
| Whether § 1752 requires Secret Service to designate the restricted area and whether protectee was "temporarily visiting" | §1752’s text does not limit who may post/cordon an area; "temporarily visiting" includes a protectee’s presence at the Capitol and covers places where protectees work or visit | Statute implies Secret Service must restrict; VP and VP-elect were not "temporarily visiting" their usual workplace/residence | Held: §1752 does not require Secret Service designation; Vice President’s presence at the Capitol falls within "temporarily visiting," so §1752 charges stand |
Key Cases Cited
- Poindexter v. United States, 951 F.2d 369 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (addressed vagueness of "corruptly" in § 1505; narrow, fact-bound holding)
- Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696 (2005) (upheld use of "corruptly" language in obstruction context and required consciousness of wrongdoing)
- Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591 (2015) (residual-clause vagueness principle; distinguishes when residual language is impermissibly vague)
- Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528 (2015) (statutory construction in Sarbanes-Oxley context demonstrates limits in applying legislative history)
- Aguilar v. United States, 515 U.S. 593 (1995) (discussed culpability standards for obstruction statutes)
- Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137 (2008) (interpreting "otherwise" in a residual clause; considered but distinguished)
- Lanier v. United States, 520 U.S. 259 (1997) (vagueness analysis—statute must give fair notice of criminality)
- Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998) (principle that statutory purpose cannot override clear text)