United States v. Pringle
ACM 39172
| A.F.C.C.A. | Oct 13, 2017Background
- Appellant (Air Force member) was tried at a general court-martial: pleaded guilty to two specifications of violating no-contact orders (Article 92) and was convicted by members, contrary to his pleas, of one specification charging "divers indecent acts" against his under‑16 step‑daughter (Article 134). Sentence: dishonorable discharge, 30 months confinement, forfeiture of pay, reduction to E‑1; convening authority approved.
- Allegations dated 2003–2005 at Yokota AB: victim AC initially reported multiple sexual offenses (including indecent acts, rape, sodomy); many allegations rested on AC’s testimony and statements to three childhood friends.
- AC initially reported the abuse in 2005, then recanted during an interview after the family moved to California; she later reasserted allegations about ten years afterward during a separate AFOSI contact. The trial record contained multiple inconsistencies in AC’s statements about dates, number of incidents, and whether she had recanted.
- Military judge accepted Appellant’s guilty pleas to the no‑contact order violations after a detailed plea inquiry; Appellant admitted intent to solicit third parties to contact the protected persons.
- The members convicted Appellant of only one of the indecent‑acts specifications; appellate court reviewed legal and factual sufficiency and found the evidence as to that indecent‑acts charge factually insufficient.
- Result: convictions for the indecent‑acts specification and Charge III were set aside and dismissed with prejudice; convictions for the no‑contact order specifications (Charge IV) were affirmed; sentence was set aside and a rehearing on sentence was authorized.
Issues
| Issue | Appellant's Argument | Government's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Were pleas to no‑contact orders provident? | Plea may be defective because some described communications wouldn’t necessarily cause third‑party contact. | Plea inquiry established Appellant knowingly solicited third parties to contact protected persons and knew he violated orders. | Pleas provident; convictions for Charge IV affirmed. |
| Legal & factual sufficiency of conviction for "divers indecent acts" (Specification 1, Charge III)? | Evidence (primarily AC’s testimony) was unreliable and inconsistent; factual insufficiency. | Members could credit AC’s testimony and some circumstantial corroboration supported the finding. | Evidence factually insufficient; finding set aside and dismissed with prejudice. |
| Admission of propensity instruction under Mil. R. Evid. 413 and related evidentiary rulings? | Appellant argued abuse of discretion in giving a propensity instruction. | Government relied on trial record and judge’s discretion. | Court declined to decide after setting aside the indecent‑acts finding. |
| Sentence relief and post‑trial procedure (including sentencing credit and delays)? | Appellant sought sentencing credit for pretrial punishment and relief for post‑trial delay; also raised ineffective assistance and Confrontation claims. | Government opposed. | Court set aside sentence and authorized rehearing on sentence; other issues not addressed in light of reversal. |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Blouin, 74 M.J. 247 (C.A.A.F.) (standard of review for acceptance of guilty pleas)
- United States v. Moon, 73 M.J. 382 (C.A.A.F.) (substantial basis test for pleas)
- United States v. Passut, 73 M.J. 27 (C.A.A.F.) (plea review principles)
- United States v. Mull, 76 M.J. 741 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App.) (military judge’s duty to elicit factual basis for plea)
- United States v. Weeks, 71 M.J. 44 (C.A.A.F.) (abuse of discretion if judge accepts plea without adequate factual basis)
- United States v. Jordan, 57 M.J. 236 (C.A.A.F.) (consider entire record in plea review)
- United States v. Murphy, 74 M.J. 302 (C.A.A.F.) (definition of provident plea)
- United States v. Hines, 73 M.J. 119 (C.A.A.F.) (inconsistency between plea and accused’s statements)
- United States v. Beatty, 64 M.J. 456 (C.A.A.F.) (legal and factual sufficiency standard)
- United States v. Turner, 25 M.J. 324 (C.M.A.) (legal sufficiency test)
- United States v. Humpherys, 57 M.J. 83 (C.A.A.F.) (legal sufficiency framing)
- United States v. Washington, 57 M.J. 394 (C.A.A.F.) (appellate factual‑sufficiency role)
- United States v. Shelton, 62 M.J. 1 (C.A.A.F.) (inconsistent findings do not automatically mandate reversal)
- United States v. Barner, 56 M.J. 131 (C.A.A.F.) (draw inferences in favor of prosecution for legal sufficiency)
- United States v. Barrow, 42 M.J. 655 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App.) (inconsistent verdicts not generally grounds for relief)
- United States v. Lyon, 35 C.M.R. 279 (C.M.A.) (same)
