496 F.Supp.3d 83
D.D.C.2020Background
- In 2008 Price was convicted of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute ≥1 kg PCP and, because of two prior drug convictions, was sentenced to the statutory mandatory minimum of life imprisonment.
- Under current law (post-First Step Act) Price would face a 15-year mandatory minimum; with good-time credit he likely would have been released by March 2020.
- On Aug. 13, 2020 Price requested compassionate release from the USP Lewisburg warden (denied same day) and then filed a § 3582(c)(1)(A) motion in district court on Aug. 31, 2020.
- Price argued extraordinary and compelling reasons based on (a) changed sentencing law and resulting disparity, (b) unwarranted disparities with more culpable co-conspirators (two co-defendants already released; one set to be released 2025), and (c) COVID-19 risk given his age, race, and health.
- The court found statutory exhaustion satisfied (30 days lapsed after the warden received the request), concluded it was not bound by the Sentencing Commission’s pre-First Step Act policy statement, and held that the combination of sentencing disparity, co-defendant disparities, and COVID risk were extraordinary and compelling.
- Applying § 3553(a) the court determined Price does not pose a danger, that continued incarceration is unnecessary to achieve sentencing goals, and reduced his life sentence to time served with three months home detention and possible location monitoring.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Exhaustion under § 3582(c) | Price: 30 days lapsed after warden received his request, so court may consider his motion. | Government: warden denied the request, so Price must fully exhaust administrative appeals before filing. | Court: statutory text allows either full exhaustion or 30-day lapse; Price satisfied exhaustion. |
| Scope of "extraordinary and compelling" and applicability of U.S.S.G. §1B1.13 | Price: courts may consider reasons beyond the Sentencing Commission’s note; First Step Act broadened access. | Government: compassionate-release reductions must be consistent with the Sentencing Commission’s policy statement. | Court: Brooker and other authority persuasive; district courts may consider any extraordinary and compelling reasons raised by defendants. |
| Whether sentencing-change and disparities qualify as extraordinary and compelling | Price: First Step Act changes and nonretroactivity produced an unjust, drastic disparity (life vs. 15 years); co-defendants received far lesser terms or were released. | Government: these factors alone are insufficient to meet the extraordinary-and-compelling standard. | Court: the combination of changed law and stark, unwarranted disparities are extraordinary and compelling here. |
| § 3553(a) factors and danger to community | Price: nonviolent offense, old prior convictions, long time served, low recidivism risk, rehabilitation, approved release plan — goals of sentencing met. | Government: life sentence for a serious crime and prior convictions indicate danger; argue §3553(a) weighs against release. | Court: considering the record, Price is not a danger; §3553(a) goals do not require continued imprisonment; reduced to time served with supervision. |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Brooker, 976 F.3d 228 (2d Cir. 2020) (First Step Act permits district courts to consider any extraordinary and compelling reasons raised by defendants)
- United States v. Algur, 960 F.3d 831 (6th Cir. 2020) (interpreting §3582(c)(1)(A) exhaustion/lapse rule)
- United States v. Redd, 444 F. Supp. 3d 717 (E.D. Va. 2020) (supporting expansive district-court review of compassionate-release motions)
- United States v. Rodriguez, 424 F. Supp. 3d 674 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (discussing compassionate release and policy-statement limitations)
- United States v. Bucci, 409 F. Supp. 3d 1 (D. Mass. 2019) (compassionate-release analysis under §3582(c))
- United States v. Decator, 452 F. Supp. 3d 320 (D. Md. 2020) (same)