United States v. Preston Phillips, 853 F.3d 432

Preston Charles Phillips pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(e) and was sentenced as an Armed Career Criminal (ACCA).
The Eighth Circuit initially affirmed the ACCA designation, treating Phillips’s Missouri second-degree domestic assault and second-degree burglary convictions as violent felonies.
The Supreme Court vacated and remanded in light of Mathis v. United States, requiring the court to reassess whether the burglary convictions qualify as ACCA predicates under the Mathis framework.
Missouri’s second-degree burglary statute criminalizes unlawful entry or remaining in a ‘‘building or inhabitable structure,’’ and “inhabitable structure” includes various vehicles and other nonbuilding locations, making the statute broader than generic burglary.
Under Mathis and Descamps, a sentencing court must determine whether statutory alternatives are distinct elements (divisible) or merely means; if divisible, the court may apply the modified categorical approach and consult conviction documents to see which alternative formed the basis of conviction.
The record lacked charging documents specifying whether Phillips’s Missouri burglary convictions were burglary “of a building,” so the Eighth Circuit vacated the sentence and remanded for the district court to determine whether the prior convictions involved a building and thus qualify as ACCA violent felonies.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Phillips’s Missouri second-degree domestic-assault convictions are ACCA violent felonies under the force clause	Phillips argued they are not violent felonies	Government argued they are violent felonies under the force clause	Mathis did not alter the prior conclusion: domestic-assault convictions remain ACCA violent felonies
Whether Phillips’s Missouri second-degree burglary convictions qualify as ACCA violent felonies (enumerated burglary) after Mathis	Phillips argued the statute is overbroad and not a categorical match to generic burglary	Government argued charging descriptions (address + "inhabitable") show the convictions involved buildings and thus are predicate burglaries; alternatively, the statute is divisible so modified categorical approach applies	Court concluded the statute can be divisible but the record lacks documents showing the convictions were "of a building;" vacated sentence and remanded for district court to determine whether prior convictions involved a building under the modified categorical approach

Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (defines generic burglary elements and supports the categorical approach)
Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (establishes limits on using the modified categorical approach for indivisible statutes)
Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (clarifies how to distinguish elements from means and when a statute is divisible)
United States v. Olsson, 742 F.3d 855 (Eighth Circuit decision on Missouri second-degree burglary and generic burglary comparison)
United States v. Sykes, 844 F.3d 712 (applies modified categorical approach to Missouri burglary and treats burglary “of a building” as an element)
United States v. Phillips, 817 F.3d 567 (Eighth Circuit’s earlier opinion affirming ACCA designation prior to Supreme Court remand)
Phillips v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 634 (Supreme Court order vacating and remanding the Eighth Circuit decision for further consideration in light of Mathis)
United States v. Lamb, 847 F.3d 928 (discusses the limited impact of Mathis on force-clause analysis and the need for additional analysis on enumerated offenses)