United States v. Porchay, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 17985

Background

Porchay was indicted in 2006 on conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine, conspiracy to conduct a financial transaction involving illegal proceeds, and money laundering counts; after multiple superseding indictments, a fourth indictment was entered in October 2007 with a new codefendant.
Her first trial (Nov 2008) ended in a mistrial on seven counts; the district court declared a mistrial and scheduled a second trial for Dec 9, 2008, later continued to May 12, 2009 due to unavailable witnesses.
The government sought continuances citing unavailability of essential witnesses housed in federal prison; the district court allowed delays and excluded time under the Speedy Trial Act, criticizing the need for three weeks’ advance notice for witness transport.
A May 12, 2009 trial occurred but ended in a second mistrial due to impeachment-related nondisclosures; Porchay then moved for a mistrial and for dismissal with prejudice, which the court denied.
The third trial began Dec 10, 2009, resulting in Porchay’s conviction on seven counts and a 150-month sentence; Porchay appeals several rulings including Speedy Trial Act grounds, suppression, and Brady/Brinkmann-related issues.
A dissenting judge would have reversed convictions and dismissed the indictment for Speedy Trial Act violations, remanding for potential dismissal with or without prejudice.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the 2007 continuance tolled the Speedy Trial Act	Porchay contends delays after 2007 violated the Act.	Porchay argues the court’s end-of-justice findings were insufficient and improper timing produced a clock violation.	No Speedy Trial Act violation; exclusions proper and reset by joinder.
Whether essential-witness tolling in 2008-2009 was proper	Porchay asserts the district court erred by tolling time without explicit witness details.	Porchay argues the exclusion lacked required findings and witness particulars; the government failed to show essentiality.	Exclusion proper; court did not clearly err in finding Coleman essential and unavailable.
Whether the 2009 delay between May and December 2009 violated the Speedy Trial Act	Porchay claims Brady-related delays caused the clock to run and should have been counted against the government.	Government argues many delays were attorney-driven or independently excludable; no violation attributed to Brady delays alone.	No Speedy Trial Act violation; delays attributable to defense actions and trial scheduling.
Whether Porchay’s Sixth Amendment right to speedy trial was violated	Delay was unusually long and prejudicial; Porchay pressed rights throughout.	Most delay attributed to Porchay’s own actions; no prejudice shown beyond statutory measures.	No Sixth Amendment violation.
Whether the district court properly denied suppression under Franks	Affidavit contained material misstatements affecting probable cause.	No intentionally reckless or knowing false statements; substantial probable cause remains even if statements excised.	Suppression denied; no Franks violation.

Key Cases Cited

United States v. Eagle Hawk, 815 F.2d 1213 (8th Cir. 1987) (essential witness standard—unquestionably important and testimony anticipated)
Hohn v. United States, 8 F.3d 1301 (8th Cir. 1993) (no explicit required findings for h(1)-(6) delays)
Bloate v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1345 (Supreme Court 2010) (some delays automatically excludable; others require enumerated findings)
United States v. Lightfoot, 483 F.3d 876 (8th Cir. 2007) (joinder of co-defendant resets defendant's speedy-trial clock)
Titlbach v. United States, 339 F.3d 692 (8th Cir. 2003) (Fourth Amendment speedy-trial considerations; delay presumptive prejudicial analysis)