United States v. PODLUCKY, 2:09-cr-00279

Background

Lynn was indicted in 2009 on multiple fraud and conspiracy counts; after trial he was convicted on 10 of 25 counts and sentenced in 2012 to 180 months imprisonment, five years’ supervised release, and restitution exceeding $660 million.
The Third Circuit affirmed his conviction and sentence on direct appeal.
Lynn filed a pro se 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion alleging ineffective assistance of counsel; the district court denied that motion in December 2014 after advising him about AEDPA’s restrictions on second or successive petitions.
In August 2015 Lynn filed a pro se petition labelled as a 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition seeking vacation of his conviction and a new trial, asserting constitutional violations stemming from alleged confiscation of funds that he claims were intended to pay his counsel.
The district court ordered Lynn to show cause why the petition should not be treated as a § 2255 motion or dismissed as a second/successive § 2255; Lynn responded but did not obtain Third Circuit certification to file a second § 2255 motion.
The court dismissed the § 2241 petition for lack of jurisdiction because Lynn’s claims attack his conviction/sentence and are cognizable under § 2255 (and he has not satisfied the requirements for a second or successive § 2255 motion); no certificate of appealability was issued.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Proper vehicle: Is § 2241 available to challenge conviction and obtain new trial?	Lynn contends § 2241 is appropriate because § 2255 is ineffective to address his claims about confiscated funds and counsel deprivation.	The court/Government argues Lynn’s claims attack the conviction/sentence and thus must be raised under § 2255; § 2241 is not the proper vehicle.	Court: § 2241 is improper; claims are cognizable under § 2255, so § 2241 petition is dismissed.
Adequacy of § 2255: Does § 2255 provide an inadequate or ineffective remedy permitting § 2241 relief?	Lynn argues AEDPA gatekeeping makes § 2255 ineffective for him.	Court/Government: Mere inability to meet AEDPA gatekeeping does not make § 2255 ineffective; the § 2255(e) safety valve is very narrow.	Court: § 2255 is not inadequate or ineffective here; Lynn does not meet narrow exceptions.
Second or successive filing: May the district court consider the new claims without Third Circuit authorization?	Lynn had not obtained circuit certification but argues his claims should be considered.	Court/Government: Absent Third Circuit certification under § 2255(h)/§ 2244, the district court lacks jurisdiction to entertain a second or successive § 2255 motion.	Court: Lynn has no Third Circuit certification; district court lacks jurisdiction to consider the claims.
Certificate of appealability (COA): Should a COA issue?	Lynn implicitly seeks appellate review.	Court: No substantial showing of denial of constitutional right.	Court: COA denied.

Key Cases Cited

Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972) (pro se pleadings are held to less stringent standards)
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957) (complaint must set forth facts that entitle plaintiff to relief)
United States v. Miller, 197 F.3d 644 (3d Cir. 1999) (district courts must advise pro se § 2255 movants about AEDPA consequences)
Jiminian v. Nash, 245 F.3d 144 (2d Cir. 2001) (§ 2241 generally challenges execution, not validity, of a sentence)
Burkey v. Marberry, 556 F.3d 142 (3d Cir. 2009) (distinguishing § 2241 and § 2255 challenges)
In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245 (3d Cir. 1997) (§ 2255 inadequate exception is very narrow)
Okereke v. United States, 307 F.3d 117 (3d Cir. 2002) (inability to meet gatekeeping does not make § 2255 inadequate)
Cradle v. United States, 290 F.3d 536 (3d Cir. 2002) (inefficacy of § 2255, not personal inability to use it, is determinative)
United States v. Brooks, 230 F.3d 643 (3d Cir. 2000) (prior § 2255 filing does not permit circumvention of second/successive rules)
Bernas v. United States, 235 F.3d 1341 (5th Cir. 2000) (ignorance of AEDPA does not permit circumventing its restrictions)