United States v. Plugh
648 F.3d 118
| 2d Cir. | 2011Background
- Plugh was investigated for child pornography; FBI searched his computer with consent and found evidence.
- He was arrested September 28, 2005; after arrest agents advised Miranda rights and offered a waiver form, which he refused to sign.
- During transport to the Rochester field office, Plugh asked for advice on what to do but no substantive discussion occurred.
- At the Rochester office, he was re-advised of his Miranda rights, then signed a waiver and made inculpatory statements.
- District court suppressed the statements, concluding an unequivocal refusal to sign the waiver invoked rights, affirmed by a Second Circuit panel in Plugh I.
- Berghuis v. Thompkins (2010) later clarified the unambiguous invocation standard, prompting reconsideration of the suppression order in light of intervening law.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Berghuis changes controlling law to revisit Plugh I | Govenrment argues Berghuis is intervening change warranting revisit | Plugh argues no change and that Davis standard applies | Yes, Berghuis constitutes intervening controlling law requiring reconsideration |
| Whether Plugh unambiguously invoked Miranda rights under Berghuis | Plugh's conduct could be seen as invoking rights | Plugh did not unambiguously invoke rights; signs form not decisive | No unambiguous invocation; not cutting off questioning |
| Whether refusal to sign waiver alone constitutes invocation | Refusal signaled invocation of rights | Refusal to sign is not necessarily an invocation; ambiguity exists | Refusal to sign not necessarily invocation; not enough to cut off questioning |
| Whether waiver was knowing and voluntary despite no unambiguous invocation | Signed waiver and conduct show knowing, voluntary waiver | Waiver could be found only if invocation not present and coercion absent | Waiver was knowing and voluntary; statements admissible |
Key Cases Cited
- Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370 (2010) (requiring unambiguous invocation of Miranda rights for initial invocations)
- Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (1994) (unambiguous invocation required to cut off questioning)
- Quiroz v. United States, 13 F.3d 505 (2d Cir. 1993) (prior view linking waiver-sign refusal to invocation of Edwards prophylaxis)
- Plugh I, 576 F.3d 135 (2d Cir. 2009) (initial panel held refusal to sign was an unequivocal invocation to suppress statements)
- Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981) (once invoked, cannot be questioned until counsel is provided)
- Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975) (regarding clarity of invocation and Mosley-type sequencing)
- MorAn v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986) (knowingly knowing waiver concepts for Miranda rights)
- Butler, 441 U.S. 369 (1979) (implied waiver when rights understood and acts inconsistent with exercise)
- Spencer, 995 F.2d 10 (2d Cir. 1993) (knowing and voluntary waiver can be inferred from conduct)
- Ramirez, 79 F.3d 298 (2d Cir. 1996) (clarifying questions not required absent unambiguous invocation)