United States v. Pina-Nieves, 59 F.4th 9

Background

In 2015 Pina-Nieves pleaded guilty to bank fraud, making him a felon under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
FBI wiretapped a February 6, 2020 call from Pina-Nieves about renovating his Caguas Real house; he referred to a safe containing “my guns, rifles, bullets” and to those guns being “unregistered.”
Agents executed a search warrant on April 1, 2020 and found a hidden room with two pistols (one a Glock modified to fire fully automatically), ammunition, magazines, and a safe with cash and a certificate in Pina‑Nieves’s name.
A grand jury indicted him on § 922(g)(1) (felon in possession) and § 922(o) (possession of a machinegun); a jury convicted on both counts and he was sentenced to 41 months.
On appeal the First Circuit affirmed the § 922(g)(1) conviction but reversed the § 922(o) conviction for insufficient evidence that Pina‑Nieves knew the Glock had been modified to fire automatically.
The court also reviewed two trial-evidence rulings (admission under Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2) of a sentence from defense counsel’s motion and exclusion of realtor testimony under Fed. R. Evid. 401) and found both errors but held them harmless as to § 922(g)(1).

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Sufficiency of § 922(o) conviction (knowledge that firearm is a machinegun)	Government: circumstantial evidence (constructive possession, visible external modification, phone call calling them “unregistered,” hidden room) supports an inference Pina‑Nieves knew the Glock was automatic.	Pina‑Nieves: no direct or circumstantial proof he ever saw, handled, fired, purchased, or was told the pistol was modified; others had access to the house; modification timing unknown — conviction requires speculation.	Reversed: evidence insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he knew the firearm’s automatic characteristics.
Admissibility under Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2) of sentence from defense counsel’s motion	Government: sentence in motion is a written assertion attributable to defendant (made by counsel) and implies a fact about defendant’s resignation to prison.	Pina‑Nieves: sentence is a legal argument about prejudice, not a factual admission; counsel’s motion not an adoptive or authorized factual statement.	Error: District Court abused discretion admitting the sentence under Rule 801; the sentence did not clearly assert the factual matter.
Exclusion under Fed. R. Evid. 401 of realtor Millman’s testimony about Pina‑Nieves’s Miami residence	Government: testimony irrelevant or cumulative to other evidence that Pina resided elsewhere.	Pina‑Nieves: Millman would provide personal-knowledge evidence that Pina lived in Miami (2010–2021), supporting lack of dominion/control over Caguas Real property and the gun.	Error: testimony met the low relevancy threshold and should have been admitted.
Harmless‑error analysis re § 922(g)(1) conviction (constructive possession)	Pina‑Nieves: admitted Rule 801 evidence was highly prejudicial and exclusion of Millman deprived defense — convictions should be vacated.	Government: even without the errors, overwhelming evidence (Feb 6 phone call where he called the guns “my” and rejected others’ suggestions) proves constructive possession beyond a reasonable doubt.	Affirmed § 922(g)(1): errors harmless beyond a reasonable probability standard because evidence of constructive possession was overwhelming.

Key Cases Cited

Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600 (1994) (knowledge/mens rea requirement for firearm regulatory offenses)
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) (standard for sufficiency review — evidence must permit a rational juror to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt)
United States v. Nieves-Castaño, 480 F.3d 597 (1st Cir. 2007) (interpretation of machinegun definition and knowledge requirement under § 922(o))
United States v. Laureano-Pérez, 797 F.3d 45 (1st Cir. 2015) (circumstantial proof can cumulatively sustain § 922(o) conviction in a close case)
United States v. Shaw, 670 F.3d 360 (1st Cir. 2012) (recent handling/firing of modified weapon supports knowledge)
United States v. Giambro, 544 F.3d 26 (1st Cir. 2008) (familiarity with weapon and visible external indicators can support knowledge)
United States v. Ridolfi, 768 F.3d 57 (1st Cir. 2014) (permitting circumstantial evidence to prove knowledge)
United States v. Rogers, 94 F.3d 1519 (11th Cir. 1996) (reversing § 922(o) conviction for lack of evidence defendant knew weapon was altered)
United States v. Michel, 446 F.3d 1122 (10th Cir. 2006) (reversing where government presented no evidence defendant observed or handled altered firearm)
United States v. Piper, 298 F.3d 47 (1st Cir. 2002) (harmless‑error standard: highly probable that error did not affect verdict)
United States v. Sepulveda, 15 F.3d 1161 (1st Cir. 1993) (cumulative‑error analysis)