United States v. Pilcher
950 F.3d 39
| 2d Cir. | 2020Background
- John Pilcher, pro se, filed a sealed 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion challenging post‑release conditions imposed after his guilty plea for possession of child pornography and attached a letter requesting to proceed anonymously.
- A magistrate judge treated the letter as a motion to proceed under a pseudonym, applied the Sealed Plaintiff balancing test, and denied anonymity: Pilcher’s conviction and identity were already public; asserted risks to him and his family were speculative; harms to his marriage were personal; and his Roe analogy was meritless.
- The district court reviewed the magistrate judge’s order for clear error or legal error and affirmed the denial. Pilcher appealed.
- The Second Circuit first resolved whether denial of a motion to proceed under a pseudonym is immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine, joining other circuits that have held such denials appealable.
- On the merits, the Second Circuit held the magistrate judge applied the correct legal standards, did not err, and did not abuse discretion in denying the pseudonym request; it also rejected Pilcher’s procedural and PACER‑related arguments.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Appealability under the collateral order doctrine | Denial should be immediately appealable (Pilcher sought review) | Govt implicitly disputed immediate appealability | Denial is immediately appealable; meets all three collateral‑order criteria |
| Application of Sealed Plaintiff balancing test | Magistrate treated the request as a "criminal" motion and failed to apply the civil pseudonym test properly | Magistrate properly applied Sealed Plaintiff factors and relied on public‑access presumption | Magistrate applied correct law and balanced factors; denial was within discretion |
| Procedural objections: construed letter as motion; magistrate authority; PACER | Court should have required a formal motion; magistrate lacked consent authority; PACER paywall undermines public‑access rationale | Pro se filings are construed liberally; nondispositive pretrial matters may be resolved by magistrate without consent; PACER fees don’t negate access rights | Court properly construed the letter as a motion; magistrate had authority under §636(b)(1)(A); PACER argument rejected |
| Chilling‑speech / default anonymity | Default anonymity should apply where filer fears harm or chilling of unpopular speech | Anonymity is the exception; party must rebut presumption of public access with specific, non‑speculative evidence | Pilcher’s fear claims were speculative and insufficient to overcome the presumption; anonymity denied |
Key Cases Cited
- Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant, 537 F.3d 185 (2d Cir. 2008) (sets balancing test and factors for pseudonym requests)
- Does I thru XXIII v. Advanced Textile Corp., 214 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2000) (denials of anonymity appealable under collateral‐order doctrine)
- James v. Jacobson, 6 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 1993) (same; supports collateral‑order appealability for pseudonym rulings)
- Kiobel v. Millson, 592 F.3d 78 (2d Cir. 2010) (discusses magistrate authority and when magistrate‑resolved matters may be treated as dispositive)