United States v. Phillipos
2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 3395
| 1st Cir. | 2017Background
- After the 2013 Boston Marathon bombing, Robel Phillipos was interviewed twice by FBI agents about entering Dzhokhar Tsarnaev’s dorm room and removal of a backpack; Phillipos later signed a typed confession.
- Phillipos was indicted and convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2) for five false statements made during the April 20 and April 25, 2013 interviews.
- Pretrial, Phillipos moved to suppress the signed confession as involuntary, submitting an affidavit describing coercive interrogation tactics; he refused to submit to cross-examination about that affidavit.
- Phillipos also proffered an expert (Dr. Richard Leo) on false confessions; the district court excluded the testimony under Daubert without holding a formal hearing.
- Phillipos moved for acquittal post-trial arguing (1) insufficiency of evidence as to materiality, (2) insufficient proof of willfulness, and (3) as-applied vagueness of § 1001. The First Circuit affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Phillipos’s Argument | Government’s Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether district court abused discretion by conditioning an evidentiary hearing on Phillipos’s willingness to be cross‑examined about his suppression affidavit | Conditioning forced choice between Fifth Amendment privilege and hearing; court abused discretion | Court could decline to credit an untested affidavit; defendant offered no other record evidence to create a genuine factual dispute | No abuse of discretion; court permissibly required testing of affidavit before granting hearing |
| Whether court erred by not making a conclusive voluntariness finding before admitting confession into evidence | Late determination prejudiced ability to develop suppression record | District court made preliminary finding and defendant failed to show prejudice from timing | No plain error; timing did not affect substantial rights |
| Whether district court erred in excluding Dr. Leo’s expert testimony without a formal Daubert hearing | A hearing was required before excluding expert testimony | No categorical hearing requirement; court fulfilled gatekeeping via multiple submissions and explained its Daubert analysis | No error; exclusion was within court’s Daubert gatekeeping discretion |
| Whether evidence was insufficient or statute vague as applied (§ 1001): materiality, willfulness, vagueness | Statements not material or of the kind § 1001 covers; insufficient proof of willfulness; statute vague as applied | Statements could naturally influence terrorism investigation; willfulness may be inferred; materiality standard is familiar and not unconstitutionally vague | Affirmed: rational jury could find materiality and willfulness; vagueness challenge rejected |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Staula, 80 F.3d 596 (1st Cir. 1996) (threshold for evidentiary hearing on voluntariness requires disputed material facts not resolvable on paper)
- United States v. Baskin, 424 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2005) (court may decline to credit an untested defendant affidavit if defendant refuses cross‑examination)
- Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (trial court’s gatekeeping role for expert admissibility)
- Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999) (trial court has discretion in how to conduct Daubert inquiry)
- United States v. Mehanna, 735 F.3d 32 (1st Cir. 2014) (materiality under § 1001 requires only that statement could naturally influence an investigation)
- Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398 (1998) (rejected the "exculpatory no" exception; plain text of § 1001 covers denials)
- Sims v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 538 (1967) (confession must be found voluntary before a jury hears it)
- Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759 (1988) (discussion of materiality standard’s historical pedigree)