United States v. Phillip Zabawa, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 11061

Zabawa, a federal detainee, assaulted Officer Murphy during a jail interaction at a federal courthouse.
Murphy sustained a cut above his eye; whether Zabawa inflict or proximate cause the injury is disputed.
A grand jury charged Zabawa with 18 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1) and (b) for assaulting and inflicting bodily injury on a federal officer.
The district court convicted Zabawa under § 111(a)(1) and (b); the sentence totaled 222 months’ imprisonment.
The district court interpreted ‘inflict’ as ‘cause’ of bodily injury, while Zabawa argued it requires direct physical causation by the actor.
Xdelay in trial and competency evaluations led Zabawa to challenge the indictment and proceedings; the court ultimately conducted a bench trial in 2010.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Meanings of 'inflict' in § 111(b) compared to 'cause'	Zabawa contends 'inflict' means direct physical causation by the defendant.	Government argues 'inflict' is synonymous with proximate cause and includes indirect causation.	Inflict requires direct physical causation; Zabawa cannot be guilty under § 111(b).
Speedy Trial Act applicability to the delay	Zabawa asserts violations of the Speedy Trial Act due to delays.	Government argues delays are properly excluded or attributable to Zabawa; no violation.	The government did not violate the Speedy Trial Act.
Sixth Amendment speedy-trial analysis viability	Delay was prejudicial and violated Barker factors.	Most delay attributable to Zabawa; prejudice not shown; assertion not timely.	No Sixth Amendment violation; Barker factors weigh against Zabawa.

United States v. Gagnon, 553 F.3d 1021 (6th Cir. 2009) (statutory-interpretation de novo; undefined terms to be given ordinary meaning)
United States v. Lumbard, 706 F.3d 716 (6th Cir. 2013) (dictionary-based approach to undefined statutory terms)
United States v. Tinklenberg, 579 F.3d 589 (6th Cir. 2009) (Speedy Trial Act timing and competency-related delays; clock stays stopped)
United States v. Jackson, 310 F.3d 554 (7th Cir. 2002) (inflict = direct physical causation; restraint and handcuffing context)
United States v. Garcia-Camacho, 122 F.3d 1265 (9th Cir. 1997) (discussion of inflict vs. cause in § 111(b))
United States v. Turner, 602 F.3d 778 (6th Cir. 2010) (speedy-trial exclusions under transportation-related delays)
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972) (four-factor test for speedy-trial right)
Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647 (1992) (prejudice and delay presumptions in speedy-trial analysis)
Ferreira, 665 F.3d 701 (6th Cir. 2011) (presumption against prejudicial delay; government negligence standard)
Robinson, 455 F.3d 602 (6th Cir. 2006) (Barker factors and threshold one-year delay rule)
Brown, 498 F.3d 523 (6th Cir. 2007) (assignment of delay blame and Barker-factor weighting)
Wright, 343 F.3d 849 (6th Cir. 2003) (prejudice standard for speedy-trial; memory loss insufficient)
Young, 657 F.3d 408 (6th Cir. 2011) (de novo review of speedy-trial decision on Sixth Amendment grounds)