United States v. Perez
27 F.4th 1101
| 5th Cir. | 2022Background
- Gabriel Perez was convicted of conspiracy to distribute >5 kg cocaine and ≥50 g crack; sentenced to 240 months imprisonment and 10 years supervised release.
- Perez moved for a discretionary sentence reduction under §404 of the First Step Act, showing eligibility, good prison conduct, and arguing the §3553(a) factors warranted a reduction; he clarified he was not seeking compassionate release, though he mentioned COVID-19 risks.
- The Government conceded Perez’s eligibility under the First Step Act but urged the district court to exercise its discretion to deny relief; the Government also framed arguments under compassionate release policy §1B1.13.
- The district court denied Perez’s motion in a brief order stating it had considered §404, §3553(a), and the “applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission,” and denied the motion “on its merits.”
- Perez appealed, arguing the district court failed to provide adequate reasons and may have applied the wrong legal standard by referencing Sentencing Commission policy statements (which govern compassionate release, not First Step Act motions).
- The Fifth Circuit concluded the district court’s reference to inapplicable policy statements created ambiguity about the legal standard applied, and ordered a limited remand for the district court to enter reasons for its denial; appellate jurisdiction was retained.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (United States) | Defendant's Argument (Perez) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the district court gave an adequate explanation for denying a First Step Act §404 motion | The brief order sufficed; the court stated it considered §3553(a) and need not elaborate given the case’s simplicity | The order lacked a specific factual explanation and the reference to Sentencing Commission policy statements suggests the court applied the wrong (compassionate release) standard | Remanded for a limited purpose: district court must enter reasons for denial because the reference to inapplicable policy statements created ambiguity |
| Whether the district court erroneously applied compassionate-release policy statements (§1B1.13) when deciding a First Step Act motion | Court likely considered §3553(a) and declined relief within its discretion; Evans allows assuming consideration when context shows it | The quoted “applicable policy statements” are inapplicable to First Step Act motions, so the court may have used the wrong legal framework | Court could not determine whether the wrong standard was applied; remand required to clarify the basis of the denial |
| Extent of reasons required when denying First Step Act relief (must court detail §3553(a) analysis?) | No detailed explanation always required; courts may give brief reasons and deference to sentencing judge suffices in many cases | Some factual specificity may be required so appellate review is possible; brief conclusory orders can be insufficient | Confirmed that detailed reasons not always required, but here clarification was necessary to permit meaningful review |
| Standard of review on appeal | Review is abuse of discretion; appellate court should defer absent legal error or clearly erroneous factual findings | District court may have made an error of law by referencing inapplicable policy statements | Applied abuse-of-discretion standard; because ambiguity existed about legal standard applied, remand ordered for clarification |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Abdul-Ali, 19 F.4th 835 (5th Cir. 2021) (First Step Act eligibility and discretionary reduction framework)
- United States v. Batiste, 980 F.3d 466 (5th Cir. 2020) (remand where order left unclear whether court considered reduction of supervised release)
- United States v. Evans, 587 F.3d 667 (5th Cir. 2009) (when context shows §3553(a) was briefed, courts may presume factors were considered)
- Chavez-Meza v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1959 (2018) (appellate review may require a statement of reasons to be possible)
- Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338 (2007) (deference to sentencing judge’s professional judgment in explaining sentences)
- Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007) (principles governing the required explanation for sentencing decisions)